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ABSTRACT' This paper presents suggestions for "Genetic A.L": an attempt to model the genesis
of intelligence in human infants, particularly as described by Piaget's theory of the Sensorimotor
period. The paper includes a synopsis of Sensorimotor intelligence, followed by preliminary
suggestions for a mechanism (the "Schema mechanism") for its development, and a hypothetical
Scenario which partially reinterprets Sensorimotor development in. terms of that mechanism.
The Schema mechanism focuses on Piaget's concept of the competition and evolution of mental
"schemas." The schema is modelled here as an assertion that one partial state of the mechanism's
world-representation is transformable to another via a given action, taken when the schema is
"activated". A proposed process of "correlation" allows a schema's assertion to be extended or
revised in response to empirically-observed effects of the schema's activation. Correlation uses
the formation and activation of schemas to propose and test hypotheses, in contrast with the
passive tabulation characteristic of associationist mechanisms. Further features are proposed to
enable schemas to become coordinated into composite structures, "compound actions", which can
be used by other schemas; and to synthesize new "items" (state-elements) when existing ones
prove inadequate to model the world.
The Scenario outlines how the Schema mechanism might begin to make its way through the
progression of Sensorimotor stages; development culminating in Piaget's third stage is discussed.
This development includes learning about the visual and tactile effects of eye and hand motions--
eg, learning how to look directly at an object, or to move a hand into view; and die organization of
that knowledge to designate the tactile properties of "visual objects", and vice versa-- eg knowing
how to touch an object which. is seen-- paving the way to a sensory-modality-invariant
representation of objects and space.
The Schema mechanism attempts to "learn from scratch", without built-in expertise or built-in
structure in its learning domains. In the past there has been little success among Al programs of
this genre. But many such attempts have suffered from mechanisms which were trivial in that
they placed the full burden of acquiring and structuring knowledge on one or two simple tricks,
whereas, I claim, the present effort shows a willingness to incorporate a multiplicity of elements
into a complicated mechanism. In addition, the Schema mechanism benefits from its orientation
around a nontrivial theory of development. Piaget gives a comprehensive account of the infant's
evolution of primitive problem-solving and domain-specific (chiefly object-manipulation)
knowledge; this .ccount is used here as a roadmap that describes the proper course for the
mechanism to follow. Thus, there is a nontrivial (or at least nonarbitrary) sequence of target
abilities to use as a framework for evaluating and revising the mechanism's performance.
A.I. Laboratory working papers are produced for internal circulation, and may contain Information that is, for example, too
preliminary or too detailed for formal publication. Although some will be given a limited external distribution, it is not
intended that they should be considered papers to which reference can be made in the literature.
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Introduction
0. Introduction
There is an approach to psychology, pioneered dramatically by Jean Piaget, which tries to gain insight
into human intelligence by the study of its genesis in individuals. This paper proposes a complementary
genetic approach to artificial intelligence-- one based on Piaget's theory of the initial, Sensorimotor period of
intellectual development.
In a 3-volume study-- [O.I.], [C.R.], and [P.D.I.]-- Piaget presents a theory of intelligence derived from
observations of his 3 children's first few years of life. Interpreting their behavior, Piaget reconstructs the
evolution of their underlying representations of reality, and their ways of using that representation to set and
achieve goals. Most significantly, for present purposes, Piaget outlines certain "functional invariants"-- I
would call them the mechanism-- of intelligence. These describe ways in which, at a given time, existing
knowledge/behaviors interact with the environment, and with one another; and ways in which this interaction
influences subsequent knowledge/behavior. Piaget claims that these invariants account not only for the
development of Sensorimotor intelligence, but can be discerned at the root of the later periods as well.
Piaget makes no attempt to say what's "inside" his functional invariants. He confines himself to a low-
level, black-box sketch of what they do, without investigating how. This is the gap which I propose to address.
The intent is to use Piaget's Sensorimotor study as a specification of what his "invariants" ought to do, and
attempt to engineer something which does it. I call this approach "Genetic A.I.".
This paper presents a Schema mechanism as a first approximation to the functional invariants of
Sensorimotor intelligence. Following this is a hypothetical Scenario which outlines the path of development
which the mechanism is intended to travel. So far I have only an informal anticipation of what the Schema
mechanism will do; this is preliminary to actual implementation and experimentation.
The Schema mechanism focuses on Piaget's concept of the competition and evolution of mental
"schemas." The schema is modelled here as an assertion that one partial state of the mechanism's
world-representation is transformable to another via a given action, that action to be taken when the schema is
"activated." A proposed process of "correlation" allows a schema's assertion to be extended or revised in
response to empirically-observed effects of the schema's activation. Correlation uses the formation and
activation of schemas as a way to propose and test hypotheses, in contrast with the passive tabulation
characteristic of associationist mechanisms. This, I argue, is done in such a way as to avoid the debilitating
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pitfalls of associationism.
Features are proposed to enable schemas to become coordinated into composite structures, "compound
actions," which can be used by other schemas; and to synthesize new "items" (state-elements) when existing
ones prove inadequate to model the world. This paper's Scenario sketches the role such features might play
in the child's series of reconstructions of the world in progressively more objective, less egocentric terms.
Correlation allows certain learning to take place on a given level of reconstruction, while compound actions
and synthetic items promote ascension to the next level.
The Scenario outlines how the Schema mechanism might begin to make its way through the progression
of Sensorimotor stages; development culminating in Piaget's third stage is discussed. This development
includes learning about the visual and tactile effects of eye and hand motions-- eg, learning how to look
directly at an object, or to move a hand into view; and the organization of that knowledge to designate the
tactile properties of "visual objects", and vice versa-- eg knowing how to touch an object which is seen--
paving the way to a sensory-modality-invariant representation of objects and space.
The Schema mechanism attempts to "learn from scratch", without built-in expertise or built-in structure
in its learning domains. In the past there has been little success among AI programs of this genre. But many
such attempts have suffered from mechanisms which were trivial in that they placed the full burden of
acquiring and structuring knowledge on one or two simple tricks, whereas, I claim, the present effort shows a
willingness to incorporate a multiplicity of elements into a complicated mechanism. In addition, the Schema
mechanism benefits from its orientation around a nontrivial theory of development. Piaget gives a
comprehensive account of the infant's evolution of primitive problem-solving and domain-specific (chiefly
object-manipulation) knowledge; this account is used here as a roadmap that describes the proper course for
the mechanism to follow.1 Thus, there is a nontrivial (or at least nonarbitrary) sequence of target abilities to
use as a framework for evaluating and revising the mechanism's performance. Such a framework is vital to
debugging, for early inteligence in humans develops slowly and manifests mistakes and limitations which at
first seem bizarre. In the absence of something like the Piagetian roadmap, it would be hard to tell that an
artificial mechanism was advancing successfully even if it mimicked human intelligence perfectly, let alone
knowing how to correct it when it went astray.
1. It is not presumed here that Piaget's theory has been proven correct, but merely that it's a plausible hypothesis.
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This paper includes the following sections:
* a synopsis of Sensorimotor intelligence;
* a sketch of my current, preliminary approximation to the underlying mechanism;
* a reinterpretation of some key Sensorimotor developments in terms of that mechanism. (This
can be skimmed first for a quick glance at the proposed theory.)
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1. Syriopsis of Senorinmotor Intelligen-CIe
This section summarizes my understanding of the development of Sensorimotor intelligence as
described in [O.L1 and [C.R.j.
The point of depaitrit of Piaget's theory is
* The Schema: a unit of behavior/knowledge which, by Piaget's biological metaphor, interacts
and evloves with its physical environment, and its fellow schemais. The initial schemas are merely
those of reflex responses. For quite some time, the infant's sd~emat are closely associated with the
her actions. Later sophisititions, involviing the combifation of schetias, abstraction above
specific acts and perspectives, and the "interiorization" of schemas' activity, will alldw the schema
to transcend a literal depehdence on physiadl actiotn, while retaining its. procedural flavor.
Schemas of looking, grasping what's seen, swinging, dropping, hiding one object under another,
pushing one object with anothet, are ex6t~rls dfpo ltreflex schenas.
Piaget identifies as the functional invariants of intelligence assimilatl6n and accomodation: respectively
* a schema's use of things in the world (including other schemas) as part of its own funcitoning;
and
* the modification of schemas in adjustment to novelties in the world.
Of course, Piaget doesn't try to present complete, explicit rules governing the activity and modification of
schemas. But his theory does try to chiracterize such rules and to give an intricate chronicle of the low-level
results of their functioning.
The Sensorimotor period (from birth until about age two) is the first of three broad periods of
development in Piagetian theory. Sensorimotor intelligence is expressed solely in actions which affect the
world. In the later phases-- of Concrete Operations and then Formal Operations-- the truth of assertions
about the world becomes the focus of intelligence, first for assertions about the real world, and later in the
realms of the hypothetical and the abstract. [P.C.]
Piaget distinguishes six stages within the Sensorimotor period. Each successive stage is characterized by
schemas of a new elaboration of "problem-solving" 1 or "goal-ptrsuing" activity (which never implies the
eradication of less sophiltidated schemas, or even that such schemas stop being created). The elaborations
characteristic of a given stage do not appealr simultaneously; the "stage" is just the period during which such
appearances first peak. A stage's unifority is thus a descriptive invention, and doesn't imply rigid
chronological partifioifiig.
1. The Infant's eadiet behavibr is only a Oth-o;de exhibit of "problem-solving"; later stages do greatei justic6 to the term.
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The infant's representation of reality-- space, objects, causation, time-- exhibits corresponding stages of
development. In fact, Piaget argues-- and this is among his most profound insights-- that progressively more
sophisticated techniques of intelligence, and progressively more sophisticated representations of reality, are
but two indissociable aspects of the same development-- much as we are now accustomed to viewing intellect
and affect as but views of a single process. At the outset of intelligence, problem-solving is just the dynamic
expression of the infant's representation of reality-- a natural enough idea, since the infant's schemas are
procedural: a thing is understood in terms of what can be done to/with it. So, more advanced promblem
solving results from the application of the same mechanism to more sophisticated representations of reality,
and vice versa. Eventually, of course, the child acquires explicit knowledge about thinking which can be used
to improve methods of thought; but substantial maturing of intelligence occurs even before such meta-
knowledge is evident in the child.
One critical feature of the infant's intelligence, not well captured by this summary, is the incremental
quality of its development. At least at the outset of intelligence, each new capability observed in the infant is
only slightly different than what was previously exhibited; the infant shows only minor adjustments of
activity, in apparent response to experience in prior activity. It should be kept in mind that the actual steps
are of much finer grain than are presented here. As intelligence progresses and there come to be more
powerful schemas for interpreting the world, the steps grow bolder, and, in ways that I'll discuss, less
dependent upon specific experience. So, the change from trivial to powerful steps is a smooth one; the
increments by which intelligence improves are, in effect, of size proportional to the power of existing schemas,
so the development is of an exponential character.
1.1 First Stage
Reflex Activity, Solipsist Images 1
The infant's initial schemas are those of reflex activity: eg closing the hand in response to a touch on the
palm, or sucking something which touches the lips. These schemas are exercised either in response to the
appropriate stimuli, or else spontaneously, as if for "play" or "practice".
1. I'm using a slightly different border between first and second stage than Piaget defines. This is of no importance; I lust
mention it in case anyone notices and is confused.
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Schemas from the outset admit of modifications in response to exprienced results of their activity. For
example, after many instances of disorderly reflexive groping for a nipple touching the mouth, an infant's
sucking schema appears to notice that when the nipple touches (say) the left cheek, turning to the left will be
propitious. Groping in adjustment to the nipple thus assumes a gradually more coherent appearance, as clues
such as cheek-contact are exploited.
The early development of schemas also shows generalization and differentiation. For example, the
sucking schema adjusts itself not only to the nipple, but also to other objects frequently presented to it: eg a
finger or a toy. Often, the infant will suck such an object as contentedly as if it were a nipple. But when
hungry, the infant responds with enthusiasm to the nipple while crying instead if given a finger to suck. The
appearance of this discrimination suggests that, despite the production-like character of schemas' early,
stimulus-triggered activity, the "desired" result of a schema's activity also affects its course.
The first few months of life also see the first so-called primary circular reactions. These are
patterns of action, derived by gradual differentiation of reflex schemas, which tend towards repetition. For
example, the grasp-reflex schema gives rise to a alternately-hold-then-release-object schema, and to a scratch-
object schema, etc. As with pure reflex schemas, these sometimes repeat "emptily", that is without mny
stimulus/object to interact with.
Visual schemas developing at this time include those of tracking a slowly moving object, of visually
exploring a stationary object, and of alternate glances between one object and another.
A striking feature of these early schemas is that they haven't yet "intcrtwined". For example, tactile
stimuli elicit no visual response; things seen inspire no effort at prehension. Moreover, when for example a
watched object passes beyond the infant's field of view, the infant either loses all evident interest in it, as
though it no longer existed; or else, with apparent expectation of seeing it again, either continues to look off
in the same direction, or gazes back to where the object was first seen. Similarly, an object which is touched
but not seen may be repeatedly grasped then released; but if, say, it falls to a new position, the infant will
neither search for it visually, nor move her hand to search for the object in a different position than where just
grasped.
These observations imply that the infant's model of the world-- in the sense of what-aspects of the world
the infant can react to/exploit-- is (metaphorically) solipsist in nature: the infant's universe contains not
objects of substance and permanence viewable from different perspectives, but rather "images", some visual,
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some tactile, etc., which change state in response to personal actions (themselves "known" only by the
transformations they produce). The infant's early schemas organize the world into various solipsist spaces,
each giving a group (in the mathematical sense) of operations: the operations are primitive motor actions (or,
sometimes, passive expectation), and the things operated on are sensory states.
Note the lower bound on the level of abstraction on which Piaget studies intelligence. While he
observes the organization of schemas into networks of transformations, he makes no atempt to say, for
example, what low-level visual feature detection is constituent of the "states" in an infant's visual space. In
later stages, higher levels of abstraction are considered-- referring, for example, to the position of an object,
independently of the particular sensory perspective from which it's viewed-- as the infant's schemas come to
represent things on higher levels of abstraction. The claim is: whatever level of abstraction an infant's
representation uses at a certain stage, the same function of that representation determines what the infant
understands and does, how the representation is adjusted and extended, and (as we'll first encounter in the
next stage) how the next higher level of abstraction is formed.
1.2 Second Stage
The Coordination of Primary Schemas
As reflex schemas elaborate into primary circular reactions, they also begin to intercoordinate and thus
to bridge the gap between sensory modalities. The primary circular reactions, and the intercoordinations,
both appear to have the same character of development: a schema acquires differentiated responses to, and
anticipations of, sensory signals with which it was previously unacquainted. If the new signals of one schema
are already familiar to another, then a functional intercoordination results, as when schemas of hand
movements combine with sucking to form in integrated thumb-sucking schema.
Initially, an infant will suck her finger (or other object) only if it comes in fortuitous contact with the
infant's mouth (or, slightly later, cheeks etc.). (Even then, the infant doesn't know how to keep her hand in
place, and the hand is quickly pulled away.) But random hand movements may accidently brush the hand
against the vicinity of the mouth. Not only will this trigger attempts to suck, but also, future hand trajectories
will converge to the mouth more and more directly. Eventually, the infant can smoothly and spontaneously
move her hand to her mouth, and insert and suck on a finger. Later, a more profound development is seen:
the infant is capable of carrying a grasped object to her mouth and sucking on it; thus, prehension is
coordinated with sucking.
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More striking still is the coordination which develops.between vision and prehension. Piaget discerns a
number of milestones:in this development:
* The infant watches themovements of herhand, and.gradually -learns to bringher hand into her
visual field, and keep it there while watching it.
* The infant watches while.grasping and releasing objects.
* The infant subsequently will.turn to look at an object -when the:object toucheswher hand, or will
move the object intoher.visual field-to look at it.
* At some point, the infant ~ill reach :for an object if the object andithe infant's hand are seen
together.
* Eventually, the4sight: ofthe object alone will suffice to trigger a successful attempt to.grasp it.
Of course, each of these bits and!pieces of eye/hand coordination develops notas a sudden leap, but by
gradually improved groping.
The acquisition of visual/tactile coordination has an important consequence:a hereafter, the infant's
learning and attention.:become oriented around "objects", not just particular sensory impressions. The
appearance of this more objective behavior marks the onset of the next Sensorimotor stage.
1.3 Third Stage
Secondary Ci rcula r Reactions, Objects of Subjective Permanence
Secondary circular reactions, characteristic of third stage behavior, consist of the repetition of actions in
order to reproduce fortuitously-discovered effects on objects. For example:
* The infant's hand hits a hanging toy; the infant sees it bob about, then repeats the gesture
several times, later applying it to other objects as well, developing a "striking" schema.
* A strange sound is made by accidentally striking the crib wicker with a toy. The infant
reproduces the motion- involved, and after more occasional fortuitous contacts, will rub the toy
deliberately against the wicker. However, spatial contact between the objects is not understood as
such. If the infant's position is changed such that the customary gesture fails to achieve contact
with the crib, she repeats the gesture anyway, doing nothing that adapts to the altered situation.
* The infant pulls a string hanging from the bassinet hood, and notices that a toy, also connected
to the hood; shakes in response. The infant again grasps and pulls the string, already watching the
toy rather tha thhestring. Again, the spatial and cauSal nature of the connection between the
objects is not understood; the-infant will.generalizedthe gesture to inappropriate situations.
In these reactions, the:infant-responds quickly to a novel result by using a familiar schema to reproduce
the result, even though the schema had never previously been used for that purpose. However, the effect is
discovered by accident, and only the particular schema involved in the accident is used to reproduce the
effect.
Page - 12
Second Stage
Synopsis of Sensorimotor Intelligence
Nonetheless, thanks to the intersensorial schemas of the previous stage, the current schemas transcend
particular primitive motor actions and sensory images. This, together with the more complex chain of actions
involved in, say, seeing/grasping/moving/rubbing an object, give secondary circular the reactions the
appearance of being goal-directed (where the goal is to reproduce the surprise effect), in contrast with the
stimulus-bound appearance of the primary circular reactions.
The sense in which the third stage initiates the representation of objects rather than images is perhaps
best described as follows: if one were to write a program that did the sorts of things that a third stage infant
does, the program would most naturally be written on a level of abstraction that designated objects; a
program to mimic earlier stages would most naturally lack such a level, and would instead be oriented around
sensory images.
To the. extent that they deal with objects rather than images, the secondary circular reactions can
designate primitive interrelationships between objects-- but with the limitation that the relationship is given
only by a particular schema of action, implying both unnecessary restrictions, and inappropriate
generalizations, of the relation.
Similar progress, and limitations, appear in the third stage representation of objects' permanence and
position:
* Deferred circular reactions appear. An infant, playing with a toy (via a secondary circular
reaction schema) is momentarily distracted but soon turns back to where the toy was left and
resumes playing with it. 'Ihis is similar to, but more complicated than, the earlier feat of looking
again at one image after shifting gaze to another; here, a coordination of body and hand
movements, guided by vision, is required to recapture the object.
* When the infant is watching an object that falls, moving too quickly to track so that she loses
sight of it, she will look downwards for it. At first this happens primarily when it was the infant
who held and dropped the object, and is also catalyzed by the sound of the fallen object, or by
tracking it momentarily when it starts to fall. Eventually, the reaction becomes reliable even in the
absence of such clues.
* Similarly, if the infant holds (without looking at it) an object which falls, or is taken, from her
hand, she learns at this stage to extend her hand and reclaim the object.
Thus, the third stage infant apparently conceives of objects as occupying particular positions at which
they can be reclaimed if they vanish from view. Moreover, in contrast with the previous stage, the object can
be sought in a new position, rather than the first or last place that it was recently perceived. However, closer
observation shows that this reclamation is only understood with respect to a particular schema of action. 'lhe
infant confronted with an object's sudden disappearance tries to recapture it either by extending the activity
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of a schema already-invoked to keep sight.of the thing- eg for the falling object-- or by reusing a schema just
used to secure the thig iin the :fst :place- eg reaching to regrasp an unseen object.removed from the hand.
In this latter case, if that particular gesture fails to rediscover the object, the iinfant will not (until the next,
fourth, stage) employ p•pendicular motions.in a:systematic searh for the thing but may instead revert to
looking for it in its original position
That the positien of vanished objects is first conceived only in terms of particular action schemas is
further attested to by the reacti donfan infant tolthe. intervention of an obstacle. If an infant of this stage is
presented with a toy which. as she watches, is covered with a cloth, the infant will :not attempt to raise the
cloth to recapture the *ie*- despite the fact that the infant is qulte capable of picking up.a cloth when that
itself is of interest. Wheatheltoy disappeam the infanteither loses interest, stares at where it was, or looks
back at where it was .frtnemn (ifthatwas.a different,place), but does not reach for it-- or, if already reaching
for it when sight oflitiuebl•• d, wiHll4mediately give upl
In fact, even iffteiFant's attempt to grasp a toy is thwarted by a barrier which doesn't block sight of
the toy, the infant appears tobe~ oblivious to the barrier, making no attempt to displace it or move around it.
The infant does, however, learn during. this stage to grasp and extricate the hidden toy if part of it is visible.
The need to rotatean object presents intellectual difficulties similar to those posed by the need to move
an obstacle. Suppose a third stage infant is presented with a bottle, but the bottle is held with the nipple
facing away from the child, so that the nipple cannot be seen. Thus the important part of the bottle is
obscured, not by a tra•ig object but by the rest of the bottle itself. The infant exhibits problems similar to
those produced by a separate obstacle, giving up on the nipple when it is no longer perceived. The difficulty
is not a lack of themotor•Os i•required to rotatean object, since while the nipple is visible, the infant will turn
the bottle to make the aipple accessible; this is done quite unsystematically, but persistantly until fortuitous
success is achieved. Seo thedifficulty is again a representational one, characteristic of-this stage: the "potential
nipple" (as opposed tI the nipple when actua~ .perceived),: is understood, only in connection with certain
schemas known to: actualize it. Thee is not yet a schema of rotation; the successes in orienting a visible
nipple appear to beA disa series ofseparate movements, each guided crudely by the current perception of
the nipple, and not . iad AtIE a coherent activity of reorientation. When, in the next stage, these attempts
1. This reversion. o =deswwmloeei henan.~rere advanced ones fasl tandis: occur through all atages of Sensorimotor
inteligence, andlater liuwM gMOSa a wm*
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are arranged in a coordinated structure, there will indeed be a schema of rotation, with respect to which the
potential nipple can be represented.
Finally, it should be noted that during the third stage, a "potential-X-with-respect-to-prehension" is not
strongly coordinated with a "potential-X-with-respect-to-vision". For example, an infant of this stage who
has looked at, but not touched, an object which falls below her gaze, may look downward for it, but will not
make any tactile search for it.
1.4 Fourth Stage
Coordination of Secondary Schemas
The fourth stage brings a coordination of secondary schemas analogous to the second stages's
intertwining of primary schemas. Just as the second stage allowed the infant's representation of the world to
transcend specific primitive motor sequences and sensory impressions, and abstract these to acts upon objects
(the subject of third stage learning), so the fourth stage coordinations will allow the infant's understanding to
become independent of particular acts, preparing for fifth stage elaboration of the activity of objects
themselves, and their interrelationships.
The fourth stage infant is capable of using a familiar schema for a nei purpose in a new situation. This
contrasts with the previous stage, whose secondary circular reactions did allow familiar schemas to be used for
new effects, but only if these effects had previously been empirically (and fortuitously) produced.
A classic example of this is the removal of an object blocking the prehension of a desired toy. This may
be catalyzed by the accidental displacement of the intervening object when the infant initially ignores it. But
at some point, the infant's attention is focused specifically on moving the obstacle (at first clumsily, but
successive efforts develop a well coordinated schema of displacement by picking up and moving, or by
striking). The infant's behavior makes clear that she is not interested in the obstacle itself, since it is discarded
and the desired toy is then grasped. The obstacle displacement was thus subordinated to that goal.
(Interestingly, it isn't until shortly after this displacement coordination that Piaget observes the advent of the
infant's ability to release one toy being held in order to pick up another.)
An important variation of the above displacement coordination is the removal of an object which blocks
the view of a desired toy. In transitiqn between the third and fourth stages, an infant might continue to reach
for and grasp a toy whose view was blocked, provided that the infant had already started to reach when the
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object disappeared from sight. This, along with the extrication of partially hidden objects (from the previous
stage), and the displat' cent of non-hiding obstacles, leads to the ability to react to the complete covering of
an object by removing the cover and claiMing the rediskovered object. This is quickly genieialized into a game
of repeatedly hiding .ad recodverMg aifi et.
Recall the third stage inability to, say, respond with prehension to a "potential visual object". During
the fourth stage, "potnhtial" (in contrast with actually perceived) objects with respect to different schemas are
united in a way reminiscent of the second stage's marriage of visual and tactile perceptiois. The ability to
uncover a hidden object extends this unity: not only is there a prehensile retmedy to a visual disappearance,
but the remedy is compiliated, involving a pair of secondary schemas which deal with two distinct objects.
Thus, both the pen~anence and spatial localization of vanished objects are now understood, not just with
respect to a given secondary schema, but with respect to coordinated pairs of such schemas. This begins to
put objects in spatial rlakdoidhip to one another. Similarly, the infant of this stage becomes capable of
* systematic search. Eg, when the infant drops an object, her hand will not only be moved down
to find it, but will also be moved perpendicularly in exploration of the immediate vicinity.
* systematic rotatitn. The infant can recover the obscured reverse side of an object.
* exploitation ofperspctive. The infant can shift her head to look around an obstacle.
* imitation of fimiliar but invisible movements. During the third stage, only visible actions,
producible by existing schemas, are imitated; eg grasping a toy. (Interestingly, there is no
imitation of a sequence, such as opening and closing a hand, which is exercised as a part of various
familiar schemis, but not yet differentiated in its own right.) In the fourth stage, the infant will
imitate an actid•l (such as sticking out the tongue) which she has taken many times, but without
having seen its effects. (Prior visual/tactile exploration of faces, in conjunction with sounds
sometimes acconiiptiying the gesture, provide clues that assist that identification.)
* systematic expliadtioh of novelty. When presented with a new object, the infant applies in
succession many familiar schemas to the object: shaking, striking, rotating, etc. During the third
stage, a new ob.jd woilit tend to excite some schema or other, but the current emphasis is
different: the schenias now seem focused on the object, while previously, understanding of the
object seemid ftkit•du on a particular schema. (An unexpected effect of some exploratory
action-- say, the production of an unusual sound-- may give rise to a secondary circular reaction
repeating that effeiL Piiaget calls such a reaction derived to denote that it arose in the context of
more structured activity, namely the exploration.)
Despite these advances, the fourth stage representations of reality still exhibit many limitations of
subjecivity. The most striking of these is showni by the following experiment. The infafit plays with a toy
which is taken away and hidden undei" a pillow at the left. The infant raises the pillow and reclaims the
object. Once again, the toy is taken and hidden, this time under a blanket at the right. The infant promptly
raises, not the blanket, bdt the pillow again, and appears surprised and puzzled not to find the toy.
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This sort of confusion is observed repeatedly during the fourth stage. It's a remarkable analog to the
earlier reaction to disapperance by searching in the first or last place that the thing was recently perceived, or
in a new position by extending a reclaiming schema. Then, hidden position was represented only with respect
to the comparatively simple schemas that existed. Now, hidded position is understood in terms of
combinations of such schemas, which relate pairs of objects. Although more complex, the representation is
still procedural, and the procedures involved have only developed to the point of saying something like:
"when this toy disappears, displacement of the pillow will rediscover it."
So the relationships among objects are yet understood only in terms of pairwise transitions, as in the
cycle of hiding and uncovering a toy. The intervention of a third object is not properly taken into account.
Moreover, the infant still comprehends the displacement of an object relative to herself rather that to another
object. For instance, an infant who can easily turn a block around does not yet learn to orient it relative to a
box so as to fit inside. Similarly, there is no comprehension of the need to put a stick in contact with a semi-
distant toy in order to move the toy. These feats will be possible in the following stage.
1.5 Fifth Stage
Experiments on Objects
During the fifth stage appear so-called tertiary circular reactions. These are little "experiments"
which the infant conducts to see what an object will do. For example, an infant may repeatedly drop a toy,
paying evident attention not to the act of dropping, but to the behavior of the object as it falls. Similarly, the
infant experiments with varying ways of placing an object on an inclined surface to watch it roll, or perching it
at the edge of a table so that it tumbles to the ground, etc.
These experiments extend the focus on an object's behavior, rather than personal action, noted during
the last stage. But where fourth stage explorations merely use the object in existing schemas, the present
experiments vary the exploratory schemas-- not just in response to surprise results (as with the derived
secondary reactions noted in the last section) but in provocation of unexpected behavior. (Indeed, the specific
autonomous activity of an object is yet unexpected by the infant, as evidenced by systematic inability to
account for it when necessary. For example, an infant trying to dispose of an obtrusive cushion repeatedly
pushes it back against a wall, but in such a position that it must fall back in the way again.)
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Tertiary (like secondary) circular reactions can be coordinated with other schemas in a means-end
relationship. For instance, an infant reaches through the bars of a playpen to grasp a long toy. The infant
doesn't anticipate the solidity of the bars, which block the toy from being drawn closer. (The fourth stage
infant learned about the soldity of an obstacle to prehension, but that was only with respect to movement of
the hand itselfl Here, the infant must learn that one object also blocks the motion of another object.)
Although the infant already knows how to rotate: an. object (say to find its reverse side), there is not yet a
schema fbr rotating one object relative to another, as is called for here so the toy can be oriented to allow
passage through the bars. Btit lacking such a schena, the infant nonetheless appears to identify the collision
as the source of difficulty, and for a.long whilegropes for different ways of placing the object against the bars.
Eventually, asuccessfi- orientation:is lfuncd On subsequent attempts, the infant's gropings converge more
and more quickly to the solutini anda reliable schema of object-relative rotation is evolved.
The gropings of this example are tertiary circular reactions,, as they involve deliberate variations of a
repeated action, and with interest in the effect on the object (ie whether it is making progress through the
bars), rather than in the action itself. Now there is an additional feature: the experiment is directed toward
the goal of bringing the toy closer. Thus, many schemas influence the activity:
* the grasping schema which specifies the goal.
* the schema of turning an object, relative to one's self, which gives a point of departure for the
new means needed to fulfill the goal
* importantly, the many schemas which by now exist to describe objects and space; these are
needed to interpret meaningfully the results of the experimental variations, to direct refinements
of the evolving rotationschema.
* the intermediate approximations to the objective schema which so evolve.
From the observer's point of view, the coordination of these schemas results in an important
amplification of the infant's intellectual capabilities: for the first time, the infant responds to an unexpected
obstacle by "inventing" a way to overcome it, rather than just relying on an already-existing schema. Piaget
concludes that this capability essentially falls outof
* quantitatively, the myriad schemas which can be brought to bear on a situation; and
* qualitatively, the higher level of abstraction on which the schemas now represent things,
focusing-on objects as.such;
thus allowing the same principles of interaction of schemas to yield more sophisticated results.
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Similar examples of the invention of new means are found when the infant learns to use a stick, an
underlying support, or an attatched string, to move a given object. You may recall that some secondary
circular reactions involved influencing one object by pulling another connected to the first by a string. But
that effect was discovered entirely by accident, and with no appreciation of the physical connection, During
the present stage, the infant wishing to influence a remote object learns to search for an attatched string,
visually tracing the path of connection. As with the objective rotation schema, a great deal of intermediate
groping is required to develop schemas for using a string, support, or stick. One interesting intermediate
situation that Piaget observes regarding the use of a stick is that an infant who is trying to grasp an object just
out of reach, and who has previously succeeded in using a stick to draw the object closer, will not think of
doing that unless she is already holding the stick, or unless the stick is presented to her. This is somewhat like
the state of a second stage infant who is learning to grasp what is seen, but only when the hand is seen next to
the object.
These developments add to the infant's conceptions of objects and space. Through the tertiary circular
reactions, objects are endowed with autonomous behavior; and the direction of such reactions towards goals
involving a second object teaches the infant about the solditiy of objects, and relationships among objects
themselves. This progress is also reflected in the multiple-screens problem of the fourth stage, described
above. During that stage, some improvement is made in selecting the right place to look for a vanished object,
but the accomplishment has an empirical character and the selection is often wrong, as though the infant had
learned that "looking under the blanket sometimes works instead" but without really getting the point. On
the other hand, the fifth stage infant learns reliably to search the place at which the object was seen to
disappear.
1.6 Sixth Stage
Simulation of Events
The fifth stage infant shows no sign of mentally "simulating" the activity of objects and learning from
the simulation instead of from actual experimentation. But the sixth stage furnishes evidence of this ability.
An infant who reaches the sixth stage without happening to have learned about (say) using a stick may invent
that behavior (in response to a problem that requires it) quite suddenly, with dramatically less groping than
similar inventions of the previous stage. Piaget argues that some "interiorization" of physical activity is
responsible for this capability.
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In addition, the infant now becomes capable of interpreting situations whose understanding requires
representation of events not actually observed. For instance, consider yet another form of hidden object
confusion, which thefifth stage infant exhibits: A toy is placed in a small box, without a lid, so that the infant
still sees it. Before the'infant has a chance to recover the -toy from the box, the box is imoved, beneath a
blanket where, hidden from the infant's view, toy is dumped out. The box is brought to view again, empty.
The infant is surprised thatrthe toy is no longer in the box, and does not attempt to search under the blanket.
Analogously to fburth stage progress in the multiple-screen problem, the fifth stage infant does learn,
empirically and unreliably, to seaith under the blanket. But when •<wo -screening objects are used in
succession, a remarkably parallel conrusion resuilts: the infant does not understand the need to look
specifically under that cover from which the box emerged. But now, during the sixth stage, the infant deals
successfully with these situations, apparently able to represent the unobserved displacement of the toy under
the screen.
The above developments are a miniscule sample of the explosion of intellect and knowledge which
occurs during the sixth stage. The ability to represent one's own body in objective spatial terms, to
understand personal orientation (as in being able to point back. to a house that's no longer in sight), and the
beginning of language all arise during this stage. The sixth stage thus forms a bridge between Sensorinotor
intelligence and the subsequent periods.
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2. The Schema Mechanism
NOTE: It is suggested that this section only be skimmed on a first reading. Then, as you read the
next (Scenario) section, you can refer back to here to fill in required details. After reading the
Scenario, you may wish to to reread this section in full. (Sections marked with an asterisk can be
skipped entirely on a first reading.)
This section discusses ideas for what I'll call the Schema mechanism, intended to climb the ladder
of Sensorimotor stages. By no means do I contend that I've understood how to achieve this. I claim only
some preliminary ideas in that direction, which this section presents, more as an example of how such things
might be thought about than as a theory expected to be close to working.
My intent is to regard Piaget's functional invariants of Sensorimotor intelligence as an approximate
specification of how the mechanism should behave. Any proposed feature of the Schema mechanism should
meet the following two criteria:
* empirical criterion. The feature should be roughly consistent with humans' capabilities and
limitations according to Piagetian theory. A proposed feature is considered gratuitous if it would
"preprogram" some ability which, by Piagetian theory, humans must learn instead.
* design criterion. The feature should make sense from an engineering standpoint. It should be
possible to implement and should do things which there is reason to believe would be useful to
intelligent behavior.
The design criterion includes attention to the scale of the problem: a feature is unacceptable
which may work in trivial examples but would suffer an explosion of space or time requirements if
faced with a situation with a realistically large number of elements.
The methodology here is to avoid incorporating just any clever trick that suggests itself, to focus instead
on conforming to the Piagetian specification. I take this approach, not because I consider Piaget's theory
certainly true, but because it seems like a powerful and plausible hypothesis. To try to implement it is a way
of exploring the hypothesis. But conversely, the specification should not be followed blindly; it's only
plausible that Piaget is approximately right. It certainly would not do to attempt to mimic some aspect of an
infant's behavior without reason to believe that the mimicing feature actually accomplishes something. The
above empirical and design criteria are intended to balance these concerns.
Figure 2-1 I____L____I
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The above diagram suggests an organization of the central facets of the Schema mechanism.
* The schema is a unit of representation which asserts that if a.particular action is taken when
the mechanisj's world-description is in. a pecified partial state, some new partial state will result;
schem•s state .the "rules" by which the universe is believed to work. Schemas compete for
selection to be activatepd; when a schema is activated, its.action is taken. The competition and
activation of schemas are the basis of the Schema mechanism's operation.
* Correlation is a proceqs whereby spinoff shemas are formed to extend or revise a schema's
assertion in response to the observed effects of the schema's activation.
The schemas created by correlation are constrained to be comprised only of already-existing actions and
Items (state-elements). The actions initially supplied to the Schema mechanism are primitive motor actions;
the first items correspond to primitive sensory impressions. Arguably, the newborn infant conceives of things
only in such terms; but the infant is able to build from experience more complicated actions and
world-designators. An attempt is made to endow: the Schema mechanism with such a capacity:
* Compound actions arise by the coordination of existing schemas into composite structures
which can be used as actions by other schemas. A compound action can be much more
complicated, and much more flexible, than the actions of its component schemas. Moreover, a
compound action raises the level of abstraction on which things can be represented, in that a
schema which uses a compound action is. unconcerned with the details of the action's component
schemas.
* Synthetic items are formed when existing items prove inadequate to express explanations of
observed events.
1'hen, section 3 (Sensorimotor Scenario) sketches the role such features might play in the child's series
of reconstructions of the world in progressively more objective, less egocentric terms. A central theme of the
Scenario is that correlation allows certain learning to take place on a given level of reconstruction, while
compound actions and synthetic items promote ascension to the next level.
2.1 The Schema and its Selection
2.1.1 General Description
Let's start with a unit of representation which, after Piaget, I call the schema. It looks like this:
Figure 2.1-1
Its principal parts are the
* context packet: a collcction of items (see below) which must all be on for the schema to be
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applicable.
* result packet: items expected to be turned on (or off: negative items) if the context items are
all on and the specified action is taken.
* action: elaborated below.
An item makes some assertion about the world; the item can be on or off. The first items are primitive
sensory inputs (for example, something's-touching-my-right-index-finger-tip) and the first actions are simple
motor actions (eg move-hand-forward). The first schemas correspond to simple reflex activity, with the
"stimulus" in the context, and an empty result. It will be possible to form higher-level items (corresponding
to objects and in general to arbitrary things/states) and actions (in general arbitrary transitions), to be
discussed in the following sections.
In addition to the above, the schema includes a reliability index. This is discussed in connection with
correlation in section 2.2.
The basic idea of schema selection is that at every "clock tick" (let's use discrete time) the schemas
respectively decide in parallel how important they are to activate. The importances can be compared in
parallel (in time proportionate to the log of the number of values) and the winner activated. For now,
"activated" just means effecting the schema's action if it's a motor primitive; but more interesting things to
happen with activation will appear in following sections.
The philosophy behind the importance criteria I'm about to enumerate is this: the Schema mechanism
has two mutually recursive toplevel purposes. One is to expand the frontiers of its knowledge by activating
schemas which are new or which will lead to novel situations; this will cause, in ways to be discussed in
subsequent sections, the creation and debugging of new schemas along those frontiers. The second purpose is
to use existing, reliable schemas as means to achieving specified goals-- often, goals which will arise in the
pursuit of the first purpose. Expressed more loosely, the mechanism tries both to create problems and to
solve them, each effort nurtured by the other. The importance criteria presented throughout this paper reflect
these two basic concerns.
Some importance criteria are Intrinsic to a schema:
* A critical question is whether the schema is alerted, ie whether all the items in its context are
on. This is requisite for most other importance criteria to be engaged.
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*A newly-mrred or long-unused schema assumes extra importance, to encourage exploration of
the unfamiliar. Snme novelty Index might exist (per schema) to reflect this.
* A schema is of increased importance to the extent that it "leads to" a complicated network of
other schemas. This could be achieved via a fertility index per schema which, upon each
activation of a schema, gets set to the number of schemas alerted in the following clock tick (or to
some average of that and the index's previous value, or something). The number could be
weighted by the importances of the alerted schemas.
* Conversely, a schema is important to the extent that it is "led to" by many other schemas: the
development of such a hema contributes to the others' fertility. An accessibility index can
measure is.
Figure 2.1-3
* It might be ums to have a hysteresis effect.that maintains attention by temporarily
increasing the importance of any schema which gets activated.
Other importance criteria depend upon the desirability of a schema's items:
* certain sensory items can be inherently "pleasurable" or "displeasurable", affecting the value of
schemas containing them in their result packets.
* more important is a goal biasing feature-- essentially the above feature but with items of
variable desirability: whenever a schema is activated, its result items are goal-biased. Then, other
schemas whose result packets include those items assume greater value. This can facilitate:
* the various circular reactions
* the tendency towards imitation
* best of all, it allows a given schema in effect to specify a "goal" for other schemas to
pursue; if the given schema's result conditions don't actually result, other schemas
predicting that result will assume greater value.
* in section 2.3 it is shown how goal-biasing can contribute to the formation of
structures that designate multiple ways of achieving a particular goal.
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These goal-directed criteria affct a schema's importance proportionately to the reliabilty of the schema.
A schema can also ask to be selected for some purpose other than activation. For example, it might be
stipulated that a schema which isn't alerted but which has a goal-biased result can compete for selection; if it's
chosen, it causes its context items to be goal-biased, in the hope that some other schema can respond and
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cause the first schema to be alerted. Still other kinds of selection are presented in subsequent sections. Each
schema decides the purpose for which it competes for selection at any given time; when the selection is made,
the appropriate event (be it acitvation or whatever) takes place.
Additional criteria of schema selection will be made up as I go along.
2.1.2 Implementation *
A few words about the implementation of schemas. I'm assuming that all packets of items (ie, so far, the
context and result packet of each schema) have parallel access to the state of all items:
I
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Figure .2.1-5
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(This assumption is, perhaps, extravagent, and it might be worthwhile eventually to try to get away with less.
But it will do for now.) Each access line can be enabled or not, to denote inclusion or not of the associated
item in the associated packet. It's assumed that the packet can compute in parallel a few very simple functions
of its items, such as conjunction, disjunction, or count of items which are on; or, if we later have reason to give
numerical values to items, summation or identifying the maximum value.
The computation of alertedness, and of goal-pursuit, is then straightforward. A schema can tell whether
it's alerted by checking the conjunction of its context packet items. Goal-biasing of a schema's result is
accomplished by sending a message to the result items (saying "you're a goal"), which can in turn be read by
other schemas whose results contain the biased items. If we want to insist that it's important to contain all of
the biased items, we can make available the current number of such items (ie place this number in some
register to which all schemas have parallel access) so that each schema can check to see if its own result
includes that number ofgoal-biased items.
When another schema comes along and goal-biases ils items, the previously-biased items should lose
their goal status. But their effect can persist, if we stipulate that schemas which were found to point to them
retain their boosted importance for a while.
A similar method allows the computation of the accessibility index: bias the schema's context items so
that other schemas can decide if their result packets include that context. The number of such schemas can
then be tallied in parallel.
Paae- 25
The Schema Mechanism General Description
The Schema and its Selection
For the sake of simplicity, I'm assuming, somewhat arbitrarily, that the computations performed by
various schemas communicating through the packets-to-items links is the only heavy parallelism which occurs
in the Schema mechanism. In particular, any construction or modification ofa schema requires the attention
of some central resource, and can't be done by several schemas locally and autonomously-- rather, it can only
come about through the serial event of schema selection.
As a point of reference, it might be wildly guessed that a "real" Schema-like mechanism would require
millions of schemas and items, and that thousands of each would suffice to obtain some preliminary results.
2.2 Correlation
This section presents a way to modify schemas in response to empirical observations, to achieve a
rudimentary form of learning. Two methods are presented, one for extending the prediction made by a
schema, the other for, restricting it. The extension mechanism watches for unexpected events which occur
reliably when a given schema completes its activity; it is hypothesized that such events result from the
schema's activity, and a new schema is created which reflects the hypothesis. The restriction mechanism is
called into play when a schema is activated but its predicted result does not obtain. Then, a new schema is
created with a more conservative prediction; and, an attempt is made to identify stricter context conditions
under which the bolder prediction is accurate.
2.2.1 Extension
I need to define a su rp rise: a surprise is the set of items whose states have just changed unexpectedly.
What's expected is that an item will maintain its state, unless the schema(s) whose action(s) just terminated
predicted that that item would turn on (or off); then, that prediction is the overriding expectation.
Typically, when a schema is activated, many surprises will occur. Some of these may in reality be
related to the schema's action. But the vast majority are likely to be coincidental. Nonetheless, all the
surprise items are put in a balloon that's attatched to the schema's result packet. (Negative items are placed
in the balloon to designate items which were offunexpectedly, rather than on; the state of a negative item is
always the opposite of the corresponding positive item.) Balloon items don't count as part of the result packet
for any purpose. But they are candidates for inclusion in the result packet.
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On subsequent activations of the schema, those balloon items which don't match the actual state of the
world are purged from the balloon.1 (No new ones are added.) Eventually, either the balloon empties-- in
which case it can be refilled to try again-- or else, its contents will be confirmed by an activation which
doesn't produce any further purging. When that happens, a new spinoff schema is created, which copies the
Regardless of how many spurious surprise items are initially stuck in the balloon, the above process
ought to find quickly any "correct" ones, for the convergence is exponential: assume that unexpected item
transitions unrelated in reality to a schema's activity have at most probability p of happening coincidentally
when the schema is activated. Then, p or less of the remaining spurious items are expected to escape being
purged on a given activation. So the number of extraneous ite,.is goes down as p", where n is the number of
purging activations.
2.2.2 Restriction
Suppose a schema is activated unsuccessfully. That is, just after its action is completed, not all of its
result items are on. The correlation feature tries to identify additional conditions for the schema's successful
operation. Two things happen:
* A spinoff schema is created, copying the old one except for those result items which didn't
behave as predicted.
* A balloon is attatched to the (original) schema's context. This is filled with all the items which
were off when the schema was activated, and the negative items of all items which were on at that
time. These are candidates for inclusion in the context packet, on the speculation that the absence
of some of them was responsible for the schema's failure.
1. Only surprise items are initially placed in a schema's result balloon since, if a given event was expected anyway, there's no
reason to attribute it to the schema. But an item escapes purging from a balloon if the item is on, even if not by surprise; for in
that case, although the item's appropriateness to the result balloon wasn't really demonstrated, neither was it contradicted.
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Following the successful activation of a schema, its context balloon is purged of any items which were
off when the activation occurred. Such items are not necessary to the schema's successful activation, so they
need not become part of the context packet. (Of course, some disjunction of such items may be necessary, but
the correlation process will not discover them.) Like a result balloon, the context balloon is confirmed when a
(successful) activation occurs which results in no further purging. Its contents are then added to the context
packet of a spinoff schema which otherwise copies the original. If the balloon empties before being
confirmed, it is refilled on the next unsuccessful activation and the process starts over. Context ballooons, like
result balloons, don't actually count for anything until they're confirned: in particular, a schema is considered
miaerted without regard for whether the context balloon items are satisfie. -
O VLY lRav We tl CM Vw*M VuOfg 4 Ef
-- • , .r I" I.AI" 4 - fUAS rf,, C-r.
Figure 2.2,2 _ d"VAAe4•"r'E4 Re Or
di3-
0·3 ---CA
9 ___,__ __
A schema also keeps track of its relkability, which ranges from 0 to i. A successful activation upgrad-s a
schema's reliability index, say by xn := (99xn +1)/100, while an unsuccessful activation degrades it to
99/100 of its old value. So the reliability index is altered only slightly by a given activation. But if a schema
has a consistent level of reliability, the index will eventually converge to it.
There is a qualification on the creation of a spinoff schema: first, it's determined if there already exists a
schema of the same identity (ic the same context items, action, and result items) as the proposed spinoff. If so,
no new schema is formed, but the existing one's reliability is upgraded.
2.2.3 Investigation *
An unpredicted effect of a schema's activation will not come to be attributed to that schema unless the
effect is reproduced in sufficiently many consecutive trials to confirm the effect. Often, this constraint poses
an undue hardship: a schema might reliably have one of several different effects, depending on the
conditions under which it's activated. For example, schema A might have any of these effects
Figure 2.2-3
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depending on these items at the time of its activation
Figure 2.2-4
What we would like to
Figure 2.2-5
following schemas
But there is a problem. The various possible effects wiild be unlikely to be confirmed in a result balloon,
since each result combination is reliable only with respect to certain yet-unguessed constraints: schema A's
context items alone do not insure any particular result combination. Conversely, there is nothing to foster the
inclusion of any of the additional conditions in a context packet until after the corresponding result has been
included in the result packet of some version of schema A. So neither the context nor the result packet can
develop (much) in the desired direction until after the other has done sol
Fortunately, this impasse can be broken, at least in certain interesting cases. To say how, I first need the
notion of a recognized surprise: this is a subset of a surprise, consisting of those surprise items which are
included in the context of the next schema to be activated-- that is, those items which are recognized by being
given a role in what happens next.
The proposed investigation process works like this: following the activation of any schema, an
exploratory spinoff of that schema is created which replicates the original, but also contains in its result
packet all the items comprising the recognized surprise which followed the originars activation. Now, the fact
that some surprise items are recognized doesn't make it obviously likely that their state-change was actually
caused by the previous activation; on the contrary, the relationship is most probably one of coincidence. But
the exploratory schema is initialized with lowest-possible reliability, and with balloon attatched to its context
as though the schema was already known to fail. The point is not ever to rely on the exploratory schema as It
stands, but rather to use it to search for additional context conditions which might justify the new, rashly-
appended result items. This search is passive: the exploratory schema is never activated in its own right.
Instead, whenever a new exploratory schema is to be created, it is first determined whether the new schema
matches an already-existing one. If so, no additional one is made, but correlation is done on the old
exploratory schema to purge its context balloon. Soon the balloon converges, most likely to emptiness, but
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possibly to context conditions which make the exploratory schema well-founded and reliable.
Thus, in the example above, the desired schemas can form if their results tend to be used in the contexts
of other schemas. For instance, if schemas A and B are activated in succession as shown here
P.LL#wV6
Figure 2.2-6
then there would i exploratory schema, which, by correlation, would give rise to the spinoff shown:
Figure 2.2-7 - Por
This resembles the fist schema in figure 2.2-5, except that only the recognized part of the schema's effect is
included in the result packet (C is omitted). The other schemas in figure 2.2-5 (or approximations thereto)
could be of similar origin.
I should state clearly the motivation for the choice of the recognized surprise as the consequence to
investigate. Any arbitrary subset of a surprise might be no less likely to have been caused by the previous
activation, but there's a reason to prefer to go exploring for the conditions that led to a recognized surprise:
simply, if this exploration is successful, its fruits are especially valuable, since the discovered results facilitate
the activation of other desirable schemas. This coordination between schemas is particularly important in
light of the mechanism presented in section 2.3 for the spawning of composite structures from coordinated
components.
2.2.4 Discussion
The kind of empirical "learning" which the correlation feature might achieve is clearly rudimentary.
The world-view implicit in the correlation process assumes that the items in a given packet relate to the
schema "linearly", in that the correctness of the inclusion of each is considered independently of other items.
(In fact, the purging of packets and balloons is like the tuning of a perceptron in which all the coefficients
must be either 0 or 1 [Perceptrons].) Moreover, only already-formed items can be taken into account, and
these are initially minimal. Clearly, very little of the universe is understandable as a linear combination of
sensory impressions. Yet the correlation feature may contribute usefully to intelligence. The very earliest
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generalizations and differentiations of Sensorimotor schemas suggest that something like correlation may play
a principal role. And the cumulative gropings of later stages may be achieved by correlation occuring within
the framework of more complicated mechanisms, and in the presence of more advanced items and actions.
In short, correlation is (hopefully) a feasible approach to what "associationism" and its relatives
attempted unfeasibly: acquiring knowledge from the empiricism of what happens in connection with what.
Correlation has substantial empirical and design advantages over associationism:
* Piaget (among others) argues emphatically that infants show no sign of making arbitrary
associations. Rather, such associations as are evidenced always seem to occur as incremental
extensions or refinements of existing schemas. Correlation has this character.
* From an engineering standpoint, associationism is an evident disaster. Associationism tends to
propose connections among any things that happen together in succession: if event Y follows
event X, the prediction X->Y is proposed. Yet a great many sensory (and other) events occur
together, most unrelated to one another. The number of ways that an arbitrary subset of one
moment's events could be responsible for an arbitrary subset of the next moment's is absurdly
large; a uselessly small fraction of such combinations are meaningful. In contrast, the correlation
process should converge quickly to a meaningful relation, since either the antecedent or
consequent conditions are "ixed" with respect to a search for the other. Moreover, expression of
the "association" in a schema makes ihe association both usable (insofar as the schema is
procedural and goal-oriented) and testable/correctable (through activation and correlation).
2.3 Compound Actions
Schemas expressed in terms of primitive motor actions may provide an adequate point of departure for
Sensorimotor intelligence. But more complicated, more abstract actions are surely needed by all but the most
rudimentary intellectual structures. This section addresses that need by the introduction of compound
actions.
Before I present the details of compound actions, it is worthwhile to show the embryonic forms of two
basic ideas from which those details arose. The first: since this is above all a genetic theory, there must be a
reasonable way for compound actions to develop under the mechanism's own power. One straightforward
way to do this is: when schemas A and B are activated in succession, A having assured the alerting of B by the
inclusion of B's context items in A's result packet, a new action can be formed which consists of A's action
followed by B's. A new schema can be created, with A's context, B's result, and the new, "abbreviated"
action:
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The result-context-inclusion qualification is to try to ensure that it will make sense to follow action X with
action Y and expect the result predicted by schema B.
There are many problems with this idea, and it is especially deficient with respect to the second basic
concern: a compound action ought to have advantages similar to those of a subroutine in computer
programming. The abbreviated representation of a fixed sequence of steps is but a small part of what
subroutines are for. More importantly, they allow matters to be represented on an elevated level of
abstraction: the subroutine internally may decide to take different courses of action on the basis of many
details, but externally it should perform a coherent function which, for purposes of building larger structures,
can be thought of without (much); regard to those details.
The compound action feature is an attempt to synthesize these two concerns. Compound actions are to
be formed in a manner which preserves the local, incremental flavor of the above abbreviation device, but in
such a way as to allow for greater flexibility in the new action: in particular, to allow the compound action to
embrace many potential paths to a common goal, to steer itself through such paths conditionally upon various
details.
2.3.1 Execution
Let's start by examining a schema with an already-formed compound action; then, we can back-track
and see how it might have develoned.
Figure 2.3-2
The schema at the left of this diagram has a compound action, which is comprised of the component
schemas pictured in the rectangle. (For contrast with the component schemas, I'll refer to the schema using
the compound action as the user schema.) The compound action is said to be enabled when any of its
components is alerted. The asterisk in the user schema's context denotes the action-enable item of that
schema's action-- an item which is on whenever the action is enabled. The overlapping of components'
result/context packets denotes their being linked as predecessor/successor in the compound action, the
significance of which is explained below.
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Should the user schema be activated, its compound action is executed as follows: First, whichever
component schema was responsible for enabling the action is activated. (If there are many such components,
some sort of arbitration singles one out) This happens as an automatic consequence of the user schema's
activation; that is, the designated component need not compete independently for activation, as a schema
ordinarily must do. Furthermore, once a component schema is activated as part of the compound aciton, it
sends a go-ahead signal to the component(s) which it's linked to (for example, schema E above tells G to go
ahead). Receipt of the go-ahead signal has the effect that the receiving schema activates automatically,
without competing for selection, provided that that schema is alerted, and provided that the user schema is still
active (see below). When two (or n) schemas have common contexts and actions-- for example, A and B
above-- each, if activated, gives the go-ahead signal to both (all) of their successors in the compound aciton--
here, schemas E and F. Typically, the successors' contexts will be mutually exclusive possible results of the
previous components' action. Passing the go-ahead to all the possible successors lets control flow
conditionally to whichever successor finds itself alerted. But if several such components are alerted, some
arbitration method should insure that only one is activated via a given go-ahead signal. The user schema
becomes inactive after one of its action's terminal schemas (here, G or H) has been activated.
The paths of control in a compound action always converge to a common terminal packet, a set of
items included in the result packets of each terminal schema (above, the terminal packet comprises items X
and Y). The terminal packet is effectively the goal around which components are organized. As action
components are activated, the flow of control can be conditional upon the result of the previous activations'
results, always tending to converge to the terminal packet. This all happens, as it were, in the background: the
schema selector has been free, since activating the user schema, to concentrate on other matters, unconcerned
with the underlying decisions in the comound action's execution. The Scenario section (section 3) will give
examples of compound actions where the divergence of activation paths (due to multiple possible results of
components' activation) and reconvergence (by conditional activation of successor components) create a
feedback system in which small errors of position and timing are continually corrected in order to maintain a
desired path, as suggested by this figure:
Figure 2.3-3
Also possible is the expression of a search in a compound action, for example:
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Figure 2.3-4
A loop of components repeas until some condition is found to be satisfied.
2.3.2 Annexation
Now we can consider how to augment a compound action with new components. One way to do this is
not very far removed from the abbreviation method at the beginning of this section. When schema B has a
compound acton, we say that A is implicitly linked to schema B when A's result packet includes: all of A's
context items (execpt that the action-enable item may be omitted), and all the context items of any of B's
action's component schemas. Thus, when A and B are implicitly linked and A is activated, it is assured that if
A's predicted result is correct, B will be alerted. So now the annexation procedure: when implicitly linked
schemas A and B are activated in succession, A becomes a component of B's action. It becomes the (a)
predecessor of the component(s) whose context is included in its (A's) result. For example, if this schema
Figure 2.3-5
would acquire a new
(Note that schema H now has two predecessor) In a situation which was like the above except that schema B
had a primitive action, B could be treated for purposes of annexation as though it had a compound action
whose sole component was B itself; B's result would become the compound action's terminal packet.
If A and B are activated in succession, but are not implicitly linked, extended annexation can still
take place. In this, a spinoff of A is created, with the result packet expanded to include whatever additional
items are needed to implicitly link A to B. This is justified by adding tle same items to the spinoffs context
na WMIl
Figure 2.3-7 , r- sIf•, (
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But extended annexation is contraindicated if the negative of a needed addtitional item is present in A's
context or result.
The annexation process is really quite conservative: it merely collects information already implicit in
existing schemas-- namely, the information that a given schema can serve as an entry point to a path leading
to a particular goal. But this can be very useful: if schemas A and B are only implicitly linked and if B's result
contains a set of goal-biased items, schema A has no way of knowing/asserting that it can be of assistance,
even if it is alerted and B is not. Of course, it might be thought that a schema competing for selection could
search for other schemas to which it's implicitly linked, checking their result packets for goal-biased items, as
well as the results of schemas one more level of indirection away, and so on. But this seems like it would be a
very hard computation to perform in parallel, and, in any case, the search could only reach finite depth in
finite time-- remember, this would have to be done every clock tick to select a new schema. So instead, we
can let annexation assist such a search: the schema selection process can, in effect, search in parallel, in fixed
time through arbitrarily long linked paths-- but only among those paths whose linkage has been made explicit
by the construction of a compound action. To see how this is so, consider, for example, what would happen if
implicitly linked schemas A and B were to be activated in succession, A thus being annexed to B's compound
action. Subsequently, the augmented B would be alerted when previously only A might have been, since now
B's action-enable item is set by A's context too. So the path through schema A to B's result packet would now
be assertable if B's result were to contain a goal-biased set of items. In general, the alerting of any compound
action component lets it be asserted (via the action-enable item) that some path is known to exist from the
current state of the world to the state denoted by the action's terminal packet. The path itself need not be
traced through until (unless) a schema using that action is activated, at which time the path is elaborated
incrementally, conditionally, and dynamically.
A new criterion of schema selection comes to mind here: whenever a schema has just finished
activating, its result items are continuity-biased. This is like goal-biasing, except that continuity biasing
promotes the selection of schemas whose contexts include the biased items. Continuity biasing promotes
annexation by encouraging successively activated schemas to be related to one another via implicit chaining.
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2.3.3 Repair
Consider next what happens if a path through a compound action is unsuccessful: say schema B below
is autactivated as part of X'scompound action, but say B's prediciton fails and item P remains off.
FIger 4[ AFl~re 2.34
Schema C does not proceed obliviously on its way sincealthough in receipt of the go-ahead signal from B, C
is not alerted. No other coiponents have been told to go ahead, so the compound action proceeds no further.
I now propose a repair procedureby which the compound action's incapacity might be remedied. The
idea is to try to enlist new component schemas-- or to use old components in new ways-- both to resolve the
problem, and to incorporate the solution into the compound action in case the difficulty recurs. Thus:
* the context of the component schema which didn't get alerted can be goal-biased. A schema
which responds successfully to this biasing will alert the stranded component and allow the
compound action to proceed. Moreover, I'll stipulate that that schema be linked into the
compound action, as predecessor of the stranded component and successor of the component
whose predictio failed. Let's allow this successor relatic.aship even if the failed component isn't
implicitly chained to the new component. ....
Figure 2.3-9
True, in that case at may just be lucky that the new component was alerted when needed. But the
action is no worse off with the new component than it was before. At worst, the new component
won't be alerted in the future following the autoactivation of its predecessor; but if some other
successor is alerted, the unavailability of the the new component won't even be noticed. At best,
the new schema's predecessor may facilitate its being alerted, making it useful that they were
linked together.
* more simply, when the compound action is interrupted, there might be a component of the
action already alerted, though not given the go-ahead. The repair process can give such a schema
a chance to resumethe action, linking the schema as a new successor to the component that failed.
(The go-ahead signal can't be waived like this in the ordinary, non-repair, operation of a
compound action, sincc.earlier components in the path may not cease to be alerted after they
activate successfully; it would be chaotic to have components continue to autoactivate even after
their turn in the path.)
* finally, if all else, fails, the Wuser schema's result items (which should include the compound
action's terminal packet items) can be goal biased. Any schema which responds to the challenge
can be linked as a new terminal schema in the compound action. In fact, this can be done even
when the user schema has no failure at all. It was already proposed in section 2.1 that a schema's
activation cause the goal-biasing of its result items. The linkage of a new terminal schema
provides further motivation for doing this: it allows disparite paths to a goal to be linked together
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into a composite structure which (externally) doesn't care which path is taken.
Each compound action has a number of reliability indexes, one per component schema. Each measures
the likelihood of the compound action successfully reaching the terminal schema when the action was
initiated via that component. If a user schema is activated and the terminal packet is reached, the reliability
index associated both with that compound action, and with the component schema which enabled the action,
is upgraded. This happens even if the schema was interrupted and had to be repaired, provided that the
repair worked, ie the terminal schema was reached. Otherwise, the index in question is downgraded. The
reliability asserted by an alerted user schema competing for activation is the product of the schema's own
reliability index (measuring the likelihood of satisfying the schema's result if the compound action goes to
completion), and the relevant action-reliability index.
Each compound action also has one "efficiency index" per component schema. This estimates how
much time will elapse before the action completes if the action is initiated with that component. The
efficiency index is updated according to the actual time elapsed in a given activation. A good efficiency index
favors a schema in competition for selection.
The repair process, though similar to annexation, is less conservative. A schema whose compound
action repeatedly fails to proceed as expected, but which is successfully repaired each time, is considered all
the more reliable-- even though there is no necessary reason to think that repair components will be alerted
again when needed (since their predecessors need not be implicitly linked to them). In effect, the repair
process lets the Schema mechanism count on its own resourcefulness to get a schema out of a jam, to the
extent that such resourcefulness has been shown to work before. Only if a compound action is interrupted
irreparably is its reliability impugned.
2.3.4 Correlation and Customization
So far, the user schemas we've been considering have been closely bound to their compound actions:
each user context has contained only an action-enabled item, and the result packet has been the same as the
compound action's terminal packct. It's necessary to consider what happens to a user schema when
correlation introduces additional items to the context and/or result. As far as possible, this should be no
different than for a schema with a primitive action, but it turns out that some special considerations are
needed when new items appear in the user context.
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In order for a user schema to be alerted, some component of its compound action must be alerted, and
any additional itemsinthe user contextmust be satisfied. Thus, the additional items effectively superimpose
extra constraints on alof the action's components. But suppose some of these additional items get cleared in
mid-activation of the ompound action. The action should then be interrupted, for nothing entitles us to
believe that the user shema is still applicable. "This interruption is easily enough arranged: simply require a
schema to remain alerted if it is to remain .active (recall that once a user schema ceases to be active, its
components will not autactivate). But a subtle problem arises here: perhaps a certain component of a
compound action itself rests in the contradiction of one of the items in the context of a user of that action.
The action will, abort as spon as the contradiction is, detected, but if this mistake is not to be repeated
perpetually, the contrary component must be disqualified from further participation in the incompatible user
schema. Thus, the ideaof casto ation arises: a pounterproductive component can be removed from a
particular user's copy ofa compound action, without affecting other users' copies.
Aside from this customization, the revision of a user schema's packets has no effect on the components
of its compound action. As for the effects of component schemas' correlation-revision on a user schema, I'm
inclined towards a linear strategy, trying to minimize such influence. So I assume that a user schema will not
be changed by the effects of correlation on its component schemas. If a spinoff version is made of a
component schema, the original alone remains in the compound action. If the original proves highly
unreliable and the spinoff is much better, let the repair process discover that and splice the spinoff in.
2.3.5 Implementation *
A compound action can acquire arbitrarily many component schemas. This suggests that it might be
difficult to implement the copying of compound actions in bounded time. But something like Fahlman's
virtual copies idea [Fahlman] can come to the rescue here: it's possible using virtual copies to have
individually revisible ygrsions of a compound action without actually copying any components, requiring only
a small, local adjustmeat forthe replication, augmentation, or customization of an action.
The central features of compound action implementation are these:
* There is an action enable packet, which governs the state of the action enable item. This packet
contains the alert item ofeach component schema of the compound action. The disjunction of the
items in this packt sets the enable item.
* Each component schema has an autoactivation packet, the conjunction of whose items
allows the schema to be, activated without competing for selection. The autoactivation packet
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contains the action's run item and some go-ahead items: these are just the run items of the
component's predecessor schema(s) (slightly delayed so that a component can autoactivate when
its predecessor has just finished running). If a component has no predecessor, its autoactivation
packet includes a dummy go-ahead item which is on momentarily when the action's run item is
first set.
* Each compound action has an action run packet containing the run items of all the schemas
using the action. The disjunction of these items sets the action's run item, which in turn affects
the autoactivation packets containing that item.
So, the addition of a new component to a compound action requires only that:
* the component's alert item is added to the action enable item;
* a new autoactivation packet, containing the appropriate action-run and go-ahead items, is
attatched to the component; and
* the component's run item is placed in the appropriate autoactivation packet of the components
successor.
"Copying" an aciton when forming a spinoff schema is even easier than adding a component: simply add the
spinoff schema's run item to the action's run packet. Here is an illustration of the ties among a user schema
ando It acion s co
Figure 2.3-10/
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Lastly we must consider how to niplfemeii the customization of a compound action. Note that if a
component schema causes some of the items in its user's context to clear, the action's run item will clear since
the user run item which was keeping it set will clear. This will disable all the autoactivation packets associated
with that action, and allow the user schema to compete for selection for doing repair. To exclude the
offending component schema, we might add the negative of the user schema's run item to that component's
autoactivation packet. However, should the current user schema give rise to a spinoff, the spinoff schema
ought to inherit the restricitons of its parent; this wouldn't happen above, since the spinoff schema's run item
wouldn't affect the previously excluded component. Thus, a modification: in place of the negated user run
item, we include a negated version ID item in the autoactivation packet. This item is established, upon the
creation of any spinoff schema, such that the item is set by the new schema's run item, or by any item which
could set the old schema's version I1) item. Thus, the exclusion of an action's component will be maintained
through all replications of that action.
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The compound action feature tries to do something which has no right to be doable: to build and
extend a coherent structure by local, incremental processes which have no anticipation or understanding of
the eventual coherence. The balance between the anarchy of local construction and the purposeful
coordinationof gldba lfunctioning is a delicate one, and might prove unfeasible. But I think the ideas put
forth in this section are promising enough to warrant further investigation.
2.4 Synthetic itens
The previous section proposes a kind of schema action more powerful, and on a higher level of
abstraction, than primitive motor actions. In this section, I suggest a new kind of item, intended to represent
higher-level things than primitive sensory inputs.
Consider a schema which remembers the position of an object, in the sense that it predicts that the
object's rediscovery will tesult from moving the hand to a given place:
oJLLT. IA-------
Figure 2A4-1 .f , .,,o" V
If this schema is to facilitate elementary Semsorimotor object-permanence, the object-in-front-of-me item
must be able to remain set even when the object isn't perceived. This item therefore could not be any
sensory-input item, or function of such items. Instead, it is paradigmatic of a new, synthetic item which is
now introduced. This section talks about how a synthetic item is fonned, and how it is set and cleared.
2.4.1 Formation
The presence of an object at a given location has the property that, by default, it often remains constant.
If not for this, it would.be unreasonable to assume the continued presence of an object after it ceases to be
perceived, and a schema stdh as the above would have no validity. This observation motivates the method I
propose for creating a synthetic item. The following null-context schema
Tro ie
Figure 2.4-2 Mh ti- tcdi istp.resen. I hir
resembles figure 2.-1, but the object-in-front condition isn't present. In this form, the schema would not be
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generally reliable, but (I'll assume for now) the correlation process wouldn't find any context items whose
addition would rectify that. Significantly, the schema would be locally consistent as to whether it worked or
not-- when it succeeded once, it would tend to continue to be successful for a while (since the object needed
for its success would, I'm assuming, tend to remain in place for a while); similarly, its failure would foretell
further failures in the immediate future. These factors-- the unreliability of a schema, the failure to discover
additional context items by correlation, and the local consistency of the schema's success or failure-- combine
to suggest that some variable, external thing or condition is requisite to the schema's successful activation. So,
we can place in the schema's context a synthetic item which, at first, is only a dummy meant to signify
whatever unknown condition is required for the schema to work. This item has the property that once set, it
remains on (at least for a while) unless something happens to clear it. Mechanisms are suggested below to
elaborate a synthetic item's significance by discovering conditions under which the item should be set or
cleared. But first, more detail pertaining to the item's creation:
In addition to the reliability index, each schema has a consistency Index. This, like the
reliability index, is upgraded or downgraded on each activation of the schema. But while the
reliability index goes up or down according to whether the current activation succeeds or fails, the
consistency index changes according to whether the curent activation did the same thing (ie
succeeded or failed) as the previous activation (or last several activations, or some such).
Now, recall the correlation process's pruning and confirmation of a context balloon in search of
necessary additions to the context packet. In section 2.2.2, 1 said that if the context balloon
empties, it gets refilled to try again. But I lied; that doesn't necessarily happen. Instead, if the
schema has a high consistency but not-so-high reliability, then a new item is synthesized, and
added to the context packet (and the correlation attempt terminates).
The second schema here could forn from the first
U'
Figure 2.4-3 -
either by investigation (when touch-something occurred as a recognized surprise) or direcy by coeration (if
the touch-something result happened to occur on enough successive trials of the schema to be confirmed in a
result balloon). In either case, a context balloon would appear (immediately in the case of investigation, or
after the first unsuccessful activation in the second case) which would converge to nothingness, giving rise to.
the synthetic "object-in-front-of-me" item shown in figure 2.4-1.
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2.4.2 Clue Schemas
It would be nice if touching-while-hand-is-in-front were to set the object-in-front item. More generally,
there ought to be a way to recognize clues that a synthetic item should be set. Here's a possible way to do
this, in two main steps: proposing a Clue, and verifying a clue.
One simple way to propose a clue is: when a synthetic item is put in a given schema's context, the result
packet of that schema is proposed as a clue that the item should be set. The rationale here is that the synthetic
item designates some thing/condition in the world that can be viewed from some perspective; the given
schema achieves that perspective, and with it a perception of the thing/condition. Above, for example, a
certain "tactile perspective" is achieved by moving my hand in front of me; this enables me to "view" (by
touch) an object in front of me. In the schema in figure 2.4-1, the proprioceptive hand-in-front-of-me item
signifies that that particular tactile perspective has been achieved; the touch-something item signifies that
something is indeed viewed from that perspective. We'd like to turn this schema around and propose that
whenever that perspective is in effect, and a thing is in. fact percieved (by touch), then there indeed exists an
object in front of me. The proposal is Impleented in a clue schema
Figure 2.4-4 ; r-*
The "action" taken by a clue schema is to set the item in the result packet.
Notice that if the proprioceptive hand-in-front-of-me item did not exist-- if touch-something were thus
alone in the result packet in figure 2.4-1-- then an entirely inappropriate clue would be proposed: that
whenever something was touched (regardless of where the hand was while doing the touching), object-in-
front-of-me should be set. More generally, if a schema with a synthetic item in its context does not explicitly
designate, in its result packet, the perspective which the schema achieves-- if it specifies only the perception
which that perspective will produce-- then the proposed clue will be inappropriate. The clue proposal rests on
the assumption that the perspective is explicitly designated.
Since the clue schema is thus formed on the basis of a weak heuristic, we'll make its initial reliability
index low. (However, its novelty/curiosity values can be made high.) But this can be changed by the clue
verification process: This consists of applying the reliability-update and correlation mechanisms to the clue
schema, in much the same way as to an ordinary schema-- except, a clue schema's success or failure isn't
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detectable until arbitrarily later, when the synthetic item is "tested". To facilitate this deferred testing, an
item which was set by a clue schema keeps a pointer back to that schema. At some point, the item may be in
the context of some activated schema. If that activation is successful, the clue schema's reliability is upgraded;
otherwise, the clue schema's reliability goes down, and the correlation mechanism in invoked, attatching a
balloon to the clue schema's context in an effort to appropriately constrain it
Some details:
* A synthetic item has a confidence level which is initialized high whenever the item is set, and
which degrades with time. When this level reaches some minimum, the item is no longer counted
on as being either on or off.
* Initially, a clue schema must compete for selection. But when it becomes sufficiently reliable,
the clue schema autoactivates whenever alerted (the clue schema is then said to be mature).
Thus, a synthetic item will eventually have its state maintained automatically by clue schemas
activating invisibly in the background. These schemas will give substance to the original
"dummy" item: the item's initial meaning is "whatever condition in the world makes the schema
in whose context I appear work". But this serves only to seed the crystallization of clue schemas;
once these congeal, they become the synthetic item's primary definition. This definition is
analogous to whatever meaning a given sensory item has by virtue of its wiring to some input
device; but the synthetic item's meaning has been programed. (Some subtle questions may arise
concerning the meaning of an item when; pathologically, its clue schemas contradict one another;
I haven't yet pursued this issue.)
* Following a successful test of a synthetic item, the item's back-pointer is erased, absolving the
clue schema of responsibility for any subsequent refutation of the item. Or, corroboration of the
item by another, more reliable, clue schema could be considered a successful test of the item, and
shift responsibility (by changing the back-pointer) to the later clue schema.
* When a clue schema is immature, it's probably a good idea to cu rlosity-bias the item which it
sets. This adds to the curiosity value (but not the goal-pursuing value-- recall section 2.1) asserted
to the selector by any schema whose context contains that item. Thus, testing the item-- and
refining the clue schema-- is encouraged.
* When a schema is activated whose result packet contains a clue to some synthetic item which is
then set, a spinoff could be made which includes that synthetic item in the result:
Figure 2.4-5
So far, rye only iscusd ways to set a synthetic item. Now here are some ways to clear one. First, a
synthetic item is said to be refuted if a schema in whose context it appears is activated unsuccessfully; the
item is then cleared and no correlation revision is done to the schema, since the item in question is (belatedly)
regarded as faulty. More precisely, this happens only if there is but one unconfident item in the schema's
context-- otherwise, there is ambiguity as to which item might be at fault (all suspects might be
curiosity-biased to promote discovery of the culprit). More precisely still, an item can be refuted only if it had
Page- 43
Synthetic Items Clue Schems
The Schema Mechanism
been set by an immature clue schema. This is in keeping with the philosophy that only until its clues are well
established is an item defined solely by the schema in whose context it appears; afterwards, an item is on if its
clue schemas say it's on, and a schema which is disappointed in its reliance on that item is itself regarded as
incorrect, and dealt with by correlation.
An item can be cleared by being refuted; but it would also be nice to recognize a clue that an item
should be cleared. For example, not-touching-something-while-hand-is-held-in-front is a good clue that the
object-in-front item should not be on. So, we ought to have clear-clue schemas which function and are
verified analogously to set-clue schemas, but are proposed as follows: if a schema with a single immature item
in its context is activated and fails, then the conjunction of the actual (as opposed to predicted) states of its
result items becomes aclear-clue. For example, if the schema
oe*vrw-# pi... .
Figure 2.4-6 "• t't-i.jg""r -
is activated without an:object existing at the expected place, the schema will fail because the touch item won't
go on. So there will app a claue schema
Figure 2.4-7
Here, as with the proposal of a clue to set an item, there is an assumption that the schema from which the clue
schema is spawned designates both the perspective, and perception from that perspective, expected to result
from the schema's activation. Here it is further guessed that when the schema is unsuccessful, the perspective
has been achieved but the thing/condition designated by the synthetic item is not present to be perceived.
Of course, not all proposed clues will be as reasonable as those of the convenient examples of this
section. But the correlation process can intervene to correct, or simply discredit, a clue schema which fails to
perform well.
Page- 44
Synthetic Items Clue Schemas
The Schema Mechanism
2.4.3 Discovery
When a synthetic item appears in a schema's result packet, there is a potential ambiguity in the
schema's interpretation: the schema's action may cause the condition denoted by the item; or, it may merely
cause the discovery of an already-existing condition (for example, a schema may say that when a ringing sound
is heard in a box, the action of opening the box will result in a bell in the box; the action doesn't cause the
object to exist there, but merely discovers it). In the latter case, the schema's context ought to be designated as
a clue for the synthetic item: if the condition is merely discovered by the schema, the condition must already
exist whenever the schema can be activated.
If, on a given activation of a schema, a result item was known to be off when the schema was activated,
the ambiguity disappears: here, it is reasonable to assume causation by the schema. But if the state of the
item was uncertain until just after the schema's activation, discovery can reasonably be proposed. This
proposal takes the form of an immature clue schema which sets the synthetic item. The clue schema's context
copies the context of the suspected schema of discovery.
*rIA''41
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Note that bell-in-box had already been determined to be a refiable resuli ofopeing tihe box in the specified
situation; only the interpretation of discovery rather than causation is new in the above proposal.
Summary
The synthetic item feature is less well thought out than features of the previous sections. I'm fairly
comfortable with the global aims for synthetic items, namely:
* the formation of synthetic items to represent things not immediately preceived;
* the "maintenance" of synthetic items' states in response to previously discovered "clues";
* the participation of synthetic items, so maintained, in ordinary schemas.
But the proposed implementations of these points seem somewhat unconvincing, and will probably be
substantially revised.
Page -45
Synthetic Items Discovery
Senaodmotor Scen•ro
3. Sensorinotor Scenario
In this section I attempt to mutually reinterpret the Schema mechanism and Piagetian Sensorimotor
theory. This is done by means of a Scenario suggesting how the Schema mechanism might accomplish some
of the milestones ofSensoimotor development.
The Scenariohasonly beekn hought through to the beginning of the third Sensorimotor stage, and even
that much is fragmentary. Many details are yet unconsidered. No doubt; this permits a twofold distortion in
the Scenario: the mechanism's capabilities may be exaggerated, and the capabilities needed to account for
various Piagetian phenomena may be underestimated. But that's all right. The Scenario is only intended as
an interpolation between the current mechanism's power, and the requirements of the Sensorimotor
progression. The difficulties encountered in filing in more details will guide the next round of revisions.
3.1 Microwbold
Let's imagine a two-dimensional univese populated by small, simply-shaped objects, along with a
"body" to be controlled by the schema inchieami:
Figure 3.1-1
The body has two legs (fbr "walking") and two arms, each of which can extend itself in various directions, in
discrete increments
Figure 3.1-2 '-- ::
up to a maximum length of, say, five increments. For each arm there exist four motor actions, for extending
the arm one increment forward, left or ,  (rlative to the body). Also, for each of the possible (body-
relative) positions bf the tip ("haind") of the *n, there is an action which will take a iqiuelice of sub-actions
that will leave the hand in that position. I'll call these positional actions, and the first kind Incremiiental.
Two kinds of primitive sensory items are associated with the arms: "touch sensor" items map onto the
perimeters of the arms and go on when their regions come into contact with anything. Also, for each hand
position, there is a proprdloC ptive item which is on whenever thehand is in that position.
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The final hand feature is the ability to grasp. Let's posit a primitive motor action which, when
activated, causes anything touching the hand to stick to it. This state continues for a short while, or until the
ungrasp action is taken. There is also a grasping sensory item which is on when an object is being
grasped.
Next, there is a "visual" system. This consists of a retina: a (say 5x5) array of items that maps onto a
portion of the world in front of (ie above) the body. If some object takes up most of the area onto which a
retina item is mapped, that item is on, So, for example, in the scene shorn in figure 3.1-1, the retina might
hn,.u
Figure 3.1-3
As with the arm, two kinds of motor actions exist for the "eyes": four incremental "glance" actions to
shift the retina's mapping one unit forward, back, right, or left (with a range of say 5x5 possible orientations);
and 25 positional actions to direct the glance to any one of those orientations. Twenty-five proprioceptive
items exist to designate, the current glance orientation.
I'm using considerable poetic license by calling this system "visual". Certainly I don't mean to imply a
strong resemblance to natural vision. I don't, for example, mean to suggest that human intelligence, at the
Piagetian level of abstraction, is (necessarily) at all concerned with the direct state of the retina, unprocessed
by intervening levels of feature detectors. The intent here is to have a sufficiently constrained universe-- with
each object mapping reliably to a certain simple pattern on the retina, with no rotations and no depth
perspective-- that special feature processing becomes unneccessary.
The extent to which this scheme is intended to model human vision is that:
* it provides a perception of a field of space capable of containing 0, 1, or several objects; and
* by redirecting the glance, the mapping from objects to perception can be changed without any
(obtrusive) physical displacement of anything.
Similarly, the hand/arm system is intended to resemble its human counterpart only qualitatively and
abstractly.
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Elaborations and extensions of the microworld will be mentioned as needed.
3.2 Original Schemas
Some schemas must be supplied at the outset. Let's assume the following "reflex" schemas:
Figure 3.2.1 m .
where "etc" denotes a collection of schemes, each of which has some ingle retina Item in its context, and each
of which has whichever incremental glance action will move the "image" towards the center of the retina. All
of the reflex schemas have empty result packets.
In addition, for every action (incremental and positional hand and glance actions, plus grasp and
ungrasp) there exists an initial schema with empty context and result
Figure 3.2-2 T , 9onV
These are given less initial "novelty value" than the reflex schemas. That way, an alerted reflex schema will
tend to be selected over these others: but when nothing else is happening, these action-only schemas can be
played with.1
In order to encourage looking at things and touching them, all retina items and tactile items are
intrinsically goal-biased. The central items are especially biased, to promote a canonical view of things; the
touch-hand (-front,-right, and -left) are also especially biased.
1. Remember, the smaller the context, the stronger the schema's assertion. A schema with an empty context is nlwas
alerted.
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3.3 Development
3.3.1 First Stage
Suppose we provide an object whose image takes up a single retina cell. If the object appears here
z
Figure 3.3-1 r
and the (alerted) schema shown is activated, then the next state of the retina should be
Figure 3.3-2
The item R2,3 is a surprise, as is the negative of R1, 3, since no activated schema predicted the state changes.
Thus, by correlation (section 2.2.1), these get placed in a result balloon on the above schema. Any
coincidental surprises that may have occurred-- tactile, auditory (supposing for a moment that we have that
modality), or even visual (in other parts of the retina)-- would also contribute to the result balloon. But these
items would tend to be purged on subsequent activations of this schema. Only R2,3 and -R1,3 would be likely
to survive long enough to be confirmed and placed in the result packet of a spinoff schema. If they, too, were
purged-- no schema is totally reliable-- they would always have another chance in a later balloon. Conversely,
if by unusual coincidence some extraneous items came to be included in the spinoff schema, all would not be
lost: the reliability index of that schema would degrade until the schema was thoroughly discredited, and a
revised schema would be spun off which would be free of the incorrect items.
In any event, there would eventually come to be a schema:
Figure 3.3-3
Now, if that schema were activated here
Figure 3.3-4
then the -R1,3 prediction would fail. The balloon attatched to the context of the schema (recall section 2.1.2)
could be expected to discover the reliable schema
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Figure 3.3-5
while purging of the result would-yield (also reliably) the less bold schema
Figure 3.3-6
Note that the Schema mechanism must learn that when something moves to a new place, it disappears
from the old one. Here we see this happening to first-stage images; but when items form to designate
object-like entities in real spatial positions, this lesson will have to be relearned on a higher level.
Note too that a schema pertaining to one portion of the retina does not automatically generalize to other
parts. For example, the achema
Figure 3.3-7
would develop separately from, but analogously to the schema in figure 3.3-5.
Similar schemas can evolve from each of the visual reflex schemas (except, those whose contexts have an
item at the edge of the retina would have less reliable "bold" versions-- see why?). So there would come to
exist a network of schemas -
*-I
Figure 3.3-8 .-
, * , r., * rc .
converging on the center of the retina. Successive activations of elements of this network would occur from
time to time, clumping the schemas into compound actions (as per section 2.3.2). This would culminate in the
creation of a schema with one large "map-to-center" compound action incorporating the whole network:
Figure 3.3-9 M•-,e -w , ,,
The action is enabled when amy imag appear on the retina, and has the effect of incrementally shifting the
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glance until the image is centered. 1
Note that this map-to-center schema could also incorporate the "feedback" effect described in section
2.4.1. When a component of the map-to-center action is unsuccessful (say because the object moved slightly)
another component is likely to be alerted instead and can be spliced in by way of repair.
Let's consider the effects of activating the various "empty" schemas incorporating the positional glance
actions. Ordinarily the only reliable surprise produced by such a schema would be turning on the
proprioceptive "glancing-at-x,y"2 item. We would thus expect schemas of this form:
.. _..~_-1 /36s3..,TFigure 3.3-10
But suppose some object is situated such that glancing at 3,3 brig the. object to view, say at R2,3 . If
this activation is repeated many times with the same effect, we wil have
Figure 3.3-11
This would lead to disappointment, however, when the schema was activated in the absence of the expected
object. Balloons attatched to the context would try to find a stronger condition for the schema's prediction,
but no known item would fit the bill. So a new item would be synthesized (section 2.4.1):
Figure 3.3-12
1,2,
The formation of clue schemas
1. There may also develop map-to-off-center actions. The visual reflex schemas are set up to encourage mapping to the
retina center, but such other mapping schemas as may evolve would do no harm.
2. The x,y here refers to the (body-relative) mapping of the retina, not to a cell in the retina.
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would occur as a straightforward analog of e dclue-formation examples in section 2.4.2 and 2.43.
Similar synthetic-based schemas and clue schemas would form for each of the positional glance actions.
Each such synthetic-based schema would know how to look back at a perceived object after the glance was
redirected away from the object. Looking in the right direction and not seeing the object would clear the
synthetic item, dashing any further expectation of the object
Note that the visual positional items are not independent from one another. For example, the
correlation revision of
Figure 3.3-14 ow .4r- , .
would ideally come to include the previous object-at-3+ 2,3 + 3 item, rather than create a new one (figure out
why this would be correct, if it's not already clear). If you step through the correlation sequence, you'll see
that, depending on whether or not the object-at-3+ 2,3+ 3 item had been set before the above glance-at-4,4
schema was activated, that item may or may not come to be included in the schema's context balloon. If it is
not, an unnecessarily distinct object-at-4+1,4+2 item will be synthesized. But object-at-3+2,3+3 can
eventually merge with object-at-4+1,4+2 when each is found to be a clue for the other. The first schema
below (which can arise by correlation) gives rise to the second one since the result packet of the first holds a
clue for the item in the result packet of the second. .
-
.- .
." . .
. . . .
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Figure 3.3-15 ' ' 0- 1 2,.3,o-
By the attribution of discovery (section 2.4.3), visual-object-at-4 + 1,4 + 2 could then be proposed as a clue for
visual-object-at-3+2,3+3. Other schemas could propose the converse clue, establishing the equivalence of
the two items. 1
1. Perhaps there should be a provision for merging two items into one when each is established as a due for the other.
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Notice that n'm schemas of the form of fig. 3.3-13 and fig. 3.3-14 can develop, where n is the number of
retina cells and m is the number of glance-mappings the retina can assume. Although this is not intolerably
many when n= m= 25, it is uncomfortable to contemplate an extension of this to larger retinas/glance ranges,
or to other kinds of large networks of transitions. But this is mitigated by the following considerations:
* Only a subset of these schemas (proportionate to n or m alone) is needed to encompass the
visual field. For instance, we could rely solely on those schemas whose actions map the image to
the retina center. The development of this subset of the map-to-x,y schemas would be especially
encouraged by the prejudicial arrangement of the visual reflex schemas (tending to center an
image), the accessiblity and fertility indices, and the goal-biasing of the central retina items.
More generally, any system of transitions might concentrate on a preferred canonical mapping.
* A larger retina (or other transition field) could be divided into low and high resolution items
(perhaps more than two levels of these). There could form a schema whose first action component
maps something onto the coarse center, and whose next component fine-tunes to a higher-
resolution center.
Further tricks for circumventing n-squared problems are likely to turn up with more thought.
To recapitulate: so far the Scenario has included the formation of schemas which will
* predict the "motion" of an image across the retina as the glance is shifted-- in particular, there is
a schema to shift the glance so as to move an image from anywhere on the retina, to the retina's
center.
* remember the "position" of an image, so that it is known where to look in order to see it again.
These have the character of some of the (solipsist) visual schemas of the first Sensorimotor stage. The
development of similar "prehensile" schemas can also be anticipated. By the same processes as described
above, schemas could form which:
* predict the migration of a touch sensation along the hand/arm as the hand is moved past an
object-- in particular, a schema which, when an object touches any part of the arm, will
incrementally move the arm until the object touches the hand; and
* synthetic items which delcare the presence of objects at various positions, with accompanying
clue schemas; eg
Figure 3.3- 1 60 "LI•.:L'" i ti, Vfcl-/I- "re wYA rAcr-nf- OrVP-
There would also be schemas dealing with grasping, andwiih moving theand while the grasp is stil in
effect. iThese would be rather boring, though, since moving-while-grasping usually (in our microworld)
entails no tactile change since the grasped object stays in the same hand-relative position. Hlowever, changes
are producible with respect to other sensory modalities, and here the fun begins.
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3.3.2 Second Stage
Recall the coordination of visual and tactile/prehensile systems which occurs during the second stage.
Here's a suggestion of how the Schema mechanism might accomplish a like intertwining.
Schemas can develop which predict the visual consequences of moving the hand. For example, suppose
a schema has been activated to look squarely at the -hand, so that the hand.appears in the center of the retina.
In order to let this be distinguishable from other objects appearing there, let me retroactively postualte this
addition to the microworld: besides the retina discussed so far, there is also a high resolution retina (I'll refer
to the "coarse" and "fine" retinas). The- fn, retina has 5x5 items which map onto the same space as a 2x2 area
RV-rAfW
r14"~
at the center of the coarse retina.
Figure 3.3-17
There are also fine incremental gac actions of the same resolution as the fine retina. The "single-square"
objects in the previous examples will now be assumed to ha e finer structure distinguishable via the fine
retina; the hand, too, has such structure. All previous discussion of schema development should still hold,
since the additional fine retina items ought not to interfere with the coarse items' inclusion in evolving
schemas; this is assured by the linearity of the correlation process. However, specific visual anticipations can
now form for often-vie
Figure 3.3-18
Sto find
"4,
where the pattern shown is that of the hand. Similar schemas could anticipate the motion of the hand's image
throughout the fine retina in response to fine glance actions.
As I was saying, suppose the hand appeans in the center of the retina. Suppose further that this schema
Figure 3.3-19 ,,ft
happens to be activated ...we a m t lrem a hd movements shi the hand by about one
happens to be activated net. If we amie that iniemetatl hued mo'ements shift the hand by about one
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fine retina position, then we can expect these items
Figure 3.3-20 E#'~ f
to turn on by surprise. If these attad dthe schema medshiW'fs attention-- say by the activation of this
,.,.,,=l
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Figure 3.3-21
arr1 A
then the above items would be a recognizedsurprise.2 By investigation (section 2.2.3), it would be included in
the result packet of an exploratory spinoff of the move-hand schema
Vr~a.
Figure 3.3-22
As an exploratory schema, this would never be activated in its own right. But after many activations of the
parent move-hand schema-- a small fraction of which activations would take place when the hand appeared at
the retina center, thus reproducing the surprise-- the context balloon on the spinoff schema would converge to
yield
rrwad'fl44
Figure 3.3-23
Similarly, there could come to be schemas that anticipate the visual consequences of incremental hand
movements throughout the fine retina. Given such a network, the investigation process can spawn a schema
that knows how to touch an object seen in front of the hand:
1. Should it appear distasteful to rely on this partly coincidental succession, keep in mind that this discussion doesn't assume
that the coincidence happens always or even gf m, but merely that sooner or later it happens a few times (not necessarily
consecutively).
2. It occurs to me here that a schema ought to be favored for competition for selection when the items in its context packet
are surprises. This would work with continuity-blasing to promote investigation and annexation.
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and similar local-touch atmm hr 1 t aarby to the right and Ai New entry points, of the form of
figure 3.3-18, could be anamd to thse schemas' actions, so that a slightly off-visual-center hand can first be
moved to the position familiar to the last schema in figure 3.3-24, after which that schema can move the hand
to touch the object. The local-touch schemas could be implicitly linked to grasp-what's-touched, and so be
annexed to that schema's action to form a local-grasp schema, capable of grasping an object when both the
object and the hand are in view. This schema, in turn, could be linked to a move-grasped-object-to-mouth
schema (assuming a mouth for now); then, anything seen near the hand could be grasped and sucked.
If we had a move-hand-into-view schema, it could be coordinated with local-grasp to allow an object to
be grasped when (initially) seen alone. The following sequence uutlines dth possible development of move-
hand-into view: ...-
.- ..---- ~ ------.------ -- -
C
In A the recognized surprise occurs when a positional hand action happens to place the hand so that it appears
in the center of the retina; then, some other schema (unspecified here) is activated which includes the see-
hand items in its context, making the surprise a recognized one. So (B) an exploratory schema is spun off, the
surprise items in its result packet. In order for the specified hand motion to bring the hand's .image to the
retina center, the retina mapping must happen to be centered at the hand's destination. In C, the correlation
process has added this condition to the context packet.
Schemas like this could develop for all glance-mappings, joining to form a compound action capable of
moving the hand into view regardless of where the gaze was directed. Let's imagine that positional hand
actions are somewhat inaccurate, so that say these few schemas are needed to cover the likely possible results:
#avaM~
Figure 3.3-26
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By the extended an
Figure 3.3-27
in order to be linke
an object can be grasped whenever it appears just above center in the coarse retina. If we have a map-object-
to-just-above-center schema (just like map-to-center but with a different target), this can be linked to the
above addition to local-grasp. The resulting action says: first, shift gaze to map the object to its canonical
retina position; then, proceed to touch and grasp it. Thus, we finally have the capability to grasp whatever is
seen nearby.
Two subtleties are worthy of mention here:
* I neglected to point out a complication in the development of the move-hand-beside-object
action. The move-hand-into-view action would inevitably acquire "look-at-hand" components-
that is, components which result in the hand's appearance on the fine retina not by moving the
hand, but by shifting the gaze. The compound action, after all, is organized around the realization
of its terminal packet, and cares little how that result is arrived at But this is a problem for move-
hand-beside-object, since gazing at the hand will not brin, the hand closer to the object. Happily,
there is a reasonable fix: precisely because they move the eye rather than the hand, look-at-hand
components would tend to violate move-hand-beside-object's context condition: the coarse retina
item would turn off. Such components would thus interrupt the schema and, eventually, be
excluded from a customized move-hand-beside-object schema (recall section 2.3.4).
This illustrates an important point about the coordination of sight and prehension. It is not
enough simply to tabulate some cross-consequences of visual and tactile events. In order to
abstract above particular sensory modalities, certain differentiations must be realized as well. In
particular, the customization of move-hand-into-view reflects the discovery that hand motions
alter but part of visual space, while eye motions shift it all. Complementary discoveries remain to
be made about the effects on tactile space of eye and hand motions.
* Note that the grasp-what's-seen schema can move the hand from any of n body-relative
positions to an object in any of n such positions, without requiring n2 components to handle the
individual cases-- this despite the Schema mechanism's characteristic insistence on separate,
virtually-equivalent versions of schemas (such as the components of the visual map-to-center
action). It seems that once a collection of items is organized into a coherent field by a network of
actions (as for example the retina items are organized by such schemas as map-to-center), the
organization can be exploited in subsequent development. In particular,* grasp-what's-seen
illustrates a kind of exploitation which I call the canonical mapping method. Its general form
is this: to transform thing A from any of n positions in a space, to the vicinity of thing B in the
same space, we can
* translate the space itself to be centered at B: this requires ::n components to take
different actions depending on B's initial position in the space; and
* move A to the center of the new space; this again requires ::n components to branch
on the possible initial positions of A in the new space.
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(Of course any other position could do just as well as the "center".) Thus, at the expense of an
extra action to map B to its canonical position, we canjnake do with 2n components instead of n2 .
Figuire 3.3-28
U.
Thus it is especially important to influence the schema selection process-- through goal biasing,
accessibility indices, etc.-- to promote the exercise of a variety of ways to arrive at a familiar
situation, so that that situation can be canonical in the above sense.
(If a compound action can run certain components concurrently, an extension of
canonical-mapping is possible whereby the preferred perspective is maintained dynamically. For
example, in an attempt to grasp a moving object, one branch of a compound action might
continuously adjust the gaze to center on the object, while another branch keeps moving the hand
towards the changing center of view.)
Just as grasp-what's-seen can develop via move-hand-into-view, a look-at-hand schema can lead to the
formation of look-at-what's-touched; details are left as an exercise. Schemas to grasp what's touched and look
at what's seen fulfill the second stage's coordination of sight and prehension.
3.3.3 Third Stage and Beyond
I haven't worked out substantive anticipations of the Schema mechanism's behavior beyond this point.
This is just as well, for an extended detailed scenario would be ponderous, and progressively unconvincing:
lengthy informal pronouncements on the powers of complicated unimplemented systems are greeted with
suspicion, as well they should be. It is now appropriate to supplant prose with programming. However, let
me wrap up the Scenario with some general aims for the Schema mechanism's conquest of later Sensorimotor
stages.
The business of the third stage is- to use the coordination of sight and prehension to develop a network
of schemas which resemble the first stage's visual schemas-- except, these new schemas deal with synthetic
items designating objects, which get organized into a (body-relative) physical space. The first-stage visual
potential object items can serve as a point of departure for the third stage items. It can be discovered how
hand movements alter potential-object items: if the hand is in sight and moves an object, the effect on
potential-object items (via visual clues) can be learned through correlation. The look-at-what's-touched
schema can lead to the proposal of tactile clues for the (formerly visual-) potential-object synthetic items,
enabling phenomena like Piaget's deferred circular reactions. At this point, a variety of sensory perspectives
will yield equivalent interpretations in potential-object items, paving the way for
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secondary-circular-reaction-type knowledge about objects to be attained through correlation.
Fourth and fifth stage developments might be expected to synthesize yet another level of
potential-object items. These could express the recoverability of an object with respect to more complicated
actions involving the displacement of an obstacle. The requisite compound action might develop by repair
when a grasp schema was interrupted by an obstacle's intervention. Similarly, the cumulative gropings of
5th-stage inventions might come about in the repair of more primitive object-manipulating actions. The need
for schemas to represent one object's position relative to another's raises some questions that I haven't delved
into yet.
These vague post-second-stage remarks are intended only to be enticing, not convincing. You may wish
to re-read the Sensorimotor synopsis of section 1, with a view towards imagining how observed behaviors
through the six stages might fit in with a Schema-like mechanism.
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"Ineffable, holy, enshrined:
so the spirit has come to be known.
But the magical imagery born of the mind
is just the same carved out of stone."
--Thomas Zimmerman
4. Conclusion
I claim that trying to figure out how humans work is perhaps the most promising way to invent a
human-like intelligence; further, that it is well to do this by studying human intelligence from its earliest
activity. Intelligence is nothing if not a Great Emulator: a new technique, mastered by a person, soon
functions as smoothly and effortlessly as if it were built in. Looking at several years' accumulation of such
things, one can scarcely hope to distinguish the "given" from the "gotten". Conceivably, a great deal of time
could be spent investigating the nooks and crannies of a vast acquired structure, without discerning the
underlying thread of acquisition. Attempting to model the genesis of intelligence affords, if not by itself a
superior chance, at least a worthwhile complement to efforts to identify that thread by replicating later
activity.
Future Directions
I've now presented a sketch of a proposed mechanism to explore, and a rough Scenario arguing that
such a mechanism might reproduce some fundamental Sensorimotor phenomena. Two paths of effort
suggest themselves at this point:
* fill in the details of the mechanism, and implement it in software along with a microworld and a
monitor system to examine schemas interactively; then test and revise the mechanism.
* develop a more comprehensive interpretation of key Sensorimotor developments in terms of the
Schema mechanism's method of representation.
These efforts are complementary. The first starts at the bottom and works upward; the second starts
with the Piagetian specification and works down towards the mechanism. The paths interact more strongly
than by a prospective meeting in the middle: the partial accomplishment of each is important to the progress
of the other. Experimental refinement of the mechanism would hold little chance of success without key
Sensorimotor vignettes to give direction-- to guide interpretations of what the mechanism is doing, and
suggest expectations of what it ought to do. Conversely, a mechanistic interpretation of Sensorimotor
phenomena requires some conception of the nature of the mechanism and its data; experimentation with the
mechanism can perhaps discover unanticipated ways of achieving some of these phenomena, and will
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certainly identify unforseen problems.
Evaluation
As discussed in the introduction, it is important that a mechanism for learning from scratch be based on
a powerful theory of how humans might do that. This is true not only because such a theory is a valuable
source of ideas for the mechanism, but also because it would otherwise be hard to tell what performance to
desire of the mechanism. It would not be obvious that the intermediate abilities of human infants were on the
right track, if not for the fact that these levels are known to culminate in indisputable intelligence; we would
be similarly in the dark as to how an "infantile" artificial intelligence should progress, unless guided by the
milestones of human development. But this guidance is not enough: when trying to simulate the beginnings
of human intellectual development, it is important to be wary of the scale of the simulation.
A common failing of learn-from-scratch programs is that they propose mechanisms which may "work"
in grossly constrained test situations (in which, say, only one "event" can occur at a time, making possible the
association of consecutive events), but which would be helpless in a realistically complicated universe. But
"'learning" in a sufficiently trivial universe can be done in so many trivial ways that there is no inherent reason
to expect a mechanism for such learning to bear any meaningful resemblence to what is needed to learn in an
interesting world. At least three kinds of distortions result from a drastic reduction of the scale of complexity
of the universe:
* combinatorics: a system which handles a situation with a trivial number of elements may suffer
an explosion of time or space requirements if more elements are introduced.
* noise sensitivity: in an idealized universe, anomolous events may never occur; a mechanism
unable to correct for erroneous or anomolous observations may thrive there, but be buried under
accumulated garbage in a realistic world.
* abstraction: when a universe is conveniently abstracted into just the kinds of elements that fobrm
the basis for meaningful predictions, a major problem in drawing empirical conclusions is
bypassed. A mechanism for learning in such a universe need not be able to disregard information
on irrelevant levels of abstraction, or create new levels.
To be sure, the microworld of my Scenario is idealized and trivial; this is an unavoidable first step. Thus the
Scenario, even if plausible, does not in itself offer any refutation of the possiblity of fatal scale problems in the
Schema mechanism. However, the ciscussion of each feature of the mechanism has included consideration of
how to implement the feature without excessive time/space requirements (allowing only for the the
extravagance of a very large crossbar). Correlation (and other, incidental features which likewise induce
assertions from emperical data) are argued to be quite correctable when they err; another kind of "noise
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immunity" is conferred by the ability of compound actions to adapt to and compensate for various
irregularities in the world. And as for abstraction, the correlation process allows items on inappropriate levels
of abstraction to be discarded along with all other irrelevant items; further, an attempt is made (via compound
actions and synthetic items) to allow the mechanism to organize levels of abstraction above that given by the
microworld and its sensory and motor primitives.
None of this, of course, is to argue that the Schema mechanism, as it stands, is devoid problems of scale.
Rather, the point is simply that enough attention is being devoted to such matters that my approach cannot be
immediately disqualified for reasons of scale.
One may be troubled by the basic thrust of Genetic A.I. for the following reason: There is a strong
impression that it would be easier to endow a mechanism from the outset with primitive knowledge about
objects and space than to design the mechanism to learn such things; why, then, should we think that
evolution built humans the hard way? Perhaps observed Sensorimotor development largely reflects the
physiological maturing of pre-encoded capabilities, rather than a cumulative acquisition from experience.
Piaget argues convincingly, but not conclusively, that Sensorimotor development is not
preprogrammed. He does this by an extensive collection of examples showing how a wide variety of new
intellectual features are plausibly interpreted as resulting from specific experiences of the infant. While there
is surely room to doubt this interpretation, Genetic A.I. uses Piagetian theory only as a hypothesis to be
explored, so it would be unwarranted to insist now on greater certainty. As to the intuitive argument that this
would have been the wrong way to "design" human intelligence, consider the following speculation. Suppose
that our species' ancestors indeed had most of their knowledge hardwired, but capabilities gradually evolved
that extended the initial endowment with learned information. Probably these early capabilities were
oriented towards highly specialized functions. But at some point, these capabilities reached such a degree of
flexibility and generality that they could be applied to domains far removed from what they were designed
for. It would then be desirable for Sensorimotor knowledge in general to be extended by the new learning
mechanism, but there is no reason to expect that the early hardwired structures would have been designed to
be interfaceable to the later learning mechanism. If functionally equivalent constructs could be derived in
software, the original structures might atrophy as the initial convenience of preprogrammedness yielded to the
power of extensibility.
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This speculation is especially favorable to Genetic A.I. in that the speculation suggests that the
mechanism for Sensorimotor learning plays a role in more general intelligence as well-- since, by this
hypothesis, it was for compatability with more general processes that this mechanism was brought to bear on
Sensorimotor knowledge. The speculation is thus consonant with Piaget's empirical claim that the processes
of Sensorimotor development can indeed be identified throughout later periods.
Other reasons for reservation about Genetic A. I. are specific to the Schema mechanism's interpretation
of Piagetian theory. The Schema mechanism's representation of the world violates many intuitive
expectations. One tends to take for granted such things as the fact that moving to there implies no longer
being here, that a rule which holds in one part of a space generalizes to other positions, etc. Customary
schemes of representation are structured around notions of objects and space in such a way as to automatically
embody such basic assumptions. A representation which must be struggled with to approach these
assumptions seems alien and inappropriate.
I.4
But the key claim here is that the Schema representation (plausibly) can be struggled with successfully,
by a mechanism resembling that presented in this paper. Though it may be uncustomary, it is not
unreasonable to try to design a representation whose paramount feature is ease and power of automatic
extensibility, even at the sacrifice of direct representational convenience. (Of course, the virtue of this is
bounded by the plausibility of the mechanism proposed to do the extending; many simple representations
built around associationist mechanisms are rightfully discounted.) And many of the Schema mechanism's
limitations are no stranger than what is being modelled: the bugs which Piaget demonstrates in children's
concepts are often bizarre and counterintuitive, and make little sense if we assume that children's internal
representations resemble those which seem most obvious to us.
In compensation for the Schema mechanism's limitations, there is beginning to emerge a collection of
techniques, not directly built into the mechanism, but apparently at the mechanism's disposal in its efforts to
acquire new knowledge and skills. The coordination of coarse-then-fine tuning, and the canonical-mapping
strategem, number among these. Hopefully a richer and more coherent set of techniques awaits discovery.
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There emerges from Plaget's theory a view of the child bootstrapping herself to intellectual competence
by a long series of reconstructions of the world in progressively more abstract and less egocentric terms.
Developments up to the third stage provide the first bootstrap step, which this paper's Scenario analyzes with
respect to two dimensions of development: the organization of higher-level actions, and the synthesis of
higher-level items. Other important dimensions are not even touched on: for example, the extension of
knowledge to embrace events unrelated to personal action, or the extension of learning whereby problems can
be solved by internal contemplation rather than by physical experimentation. It is my hope that further work
on the theory of the two easier dimensions of development will create a framework from which the more
difficult dimensions can ifruitfully be explored.
I'm far less committed to the Schema mechanism itself than to the methodology of Genetic A.I.
Although I believe that the Schema mechanism embodies several good ideas, some of which will survive to
later versions of the theory, the current proposal can be at best an early point of departure towards a
mechanism that might eveotually work. Hope'ully, though, the Schema mechanism lends weight to Genetic
A.I. by showing that plausible and fertile ideas can arise from this approach.
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I'm aware of three earlier works somewhat along the lines of this paper.
M. Cunningham [Cunningham] describes a mechanism intended to implement aspects of several
psychological theories, including Piaget's. His presentation includes a hypothetical Sensorimotor scenario
more extensive than the one here. Cunningham's mechanism seems fundamentally associationist-- it's based
on the construction of a link between all the "active elements" of one moment, and the active elements of the
next moment. Therefore I consider Cunningham's mechanism and scenario implausible. Nonetheless, it was
his effort that first suggested to me the pursuit of Genetic A.I., and provided a point of departure for the
Schema mechanism.
T. Jones [Jones] also presents a model of some Piagetian Sensorimotor phenomena. Jones' system
makes empirical associations, but only between items which are related to each other via one of a small
number of pre-supplied "patterns". Valid associations within the bounds of these relations can indeed be
discovered and verified. But Jones encounters the other side of the coin of associationist combinatorics
problems: in a realistic universe, only a tiny subset of related consecutive events will match the relations, and
the rest will escape detection. Jones speculates briefly on how new relations might be generated-- by
transitivity among old ones, or by relating variables which are "most important" by some criteria-- but I doubt
that less than a combinatoric explosion of such relations would encompass the associations that need to be
discovered. Jones' program INSIM1 has exhibited partial success in learning to coordinate two consecutive
primitive actions in order to suck its thumb; some intermediate levels of its evolving thumb-sucking ability
correspond to those described by Piaget.
J. Becker [Becker] doesn't explicitly address Piagetian theory, but his "intermediate level cognition"
explores similar issues of bootstrapping (via interaction with a simple environment) from initially sparse
knowledge, on a level of abstraction similar to what I call here the Piagetian level. Becker's schemas, like
mine, are organized into a context, action, and result. The contents of these have more built-in structure than
my "items", and Becker presents ways to generalize and differentiate schemas by comparing these structures.
Unfortunately, Becker too seems to rely on an intrinsically associationist fuel for the formation and revision of
schemas: in his microworld, events occur one at a time; full sequences of events are stored away and form
schemas which predict that sequences which match each other so far will continue to match.
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